The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVII. *March, 1911.* *No. 3.*

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonit, c. 6.*

Published by

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Washington, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

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IS EXTERNAL PERCEPTION AN ULTIMATE FACT?

A disappointing feature of modern, as distinct from scholastic philosophy is the ease with which it has allowed Idealism to discredit the doctrines of Common Sense. Take, for instance, the subject about to engage our attention—the venerable doctrine of external perception, which leaves us with or without a material world, according as we accept or reject it. Only one modern philosopher since Hegel's time has struck a blow in its defense, but so feebly was the blow delivered that those at whom it was aimed and upon whom it fell could afford to let it pass unnoticed. Thomas Reid affirmed quite boldly that we have an immediate perception of external objects; but he seems to have taken fright at the boldness of his own statement—perhaps he thought himself an unjust aggressor—for we find him suddenly denying, almost in the same breath, that we are at all *conscious* of any such immediate knowledge of reality. Not a very impressive show of resistance to the encroachments of idealism, this voice of one Scotch philosopher crying in the wilderness!

A spirit of opposition to the abandonment of 'common sense' on this pivotal point was not lacking, however, from another quarter. The natural scientists, as they are called, refused to barter away the material world and to accept in exchange for it from the idealist a world that is spiritual from centre to circumference. Physical nature meant more to them than a

mere shadowy envelope of spirit, a mysterious ground crossed and recrossed by the interplay of spiritual forces and ideas. And though no art of subtle criticism was left untried to win over to universal spiritualism these students of the great world of things, such efforts seemed all foredoomed to failure. The enchanting view of idealism that matter and force are but thought and will in thin disguises, through which reflection easily penetrates to the spiritual reality hidden beneath, left these professed observers of the ways of nature cold and unimpressed. They could not be induced to join the great anti-realist federation of the philosophers.

Science and Idealism.

But the eleventh hour usually brings strange faces into the vineyard, and so it has proved in the present instance. Scientists themselves are now deserting the realistic position for that of idealism, and the strangeness of a new speech is on their lips; for they stoutly maintain in considerable numbers at present that the object of the natural sciences is, not real things and their qualities, but our own personal *sensations* in their regard. At first sight, it would seem indeed that idealism had at last succeeded in making a very stubborn convert, but this turns out not to have been the case, when the impelling motives of this sudden change of front are traced to their source. These are found to lie, not in any previous conviction of the truth or strength of the idealistic position, whether absolutism or pragmatism, but in a peculiar working-principle which has so long gone the rounds of acceptance with scientists that they have at last begun to regard it as an exhaustive account of the nature of human knowledge. We refer to the theory of symbolism—proposed at first, it would seem, as a truce or compromise between scientists and idealists, and now without further ado imposed as a doctrine to be universally accepted—that scientific formulas are nothing more than convenient mental symbols, certainly not real knowledge at all, of the actual things we see, handle, and live among.

It must be easy to fall into the error of making a universal philosophy of the world out of a partial method of investigation, so many are guilty of it, with such dire results, in other instances than the one we are here considering, where an account of the development of human knowledge is clearly mistaken for an account of its origin and value. There are two distinct sets of conditions or principles operating in human knowledge—those which govern its original acquisition before our powers of reflection have come fully into play, and those which control its scientific elaboration after it has once been acquired. We elaborate the notions of matter, force, thing, man, self, and God; we round them out and we fill them in all our lives; even the notion of 'externality' is no exception to this rule, but rather a brilliant instance of its working. But this work of elaboration and construction has nothing whatever to do either with the original acquisition, or the ultimate value of these concepts. The history of their growth yields us no account of their origin—that is a distinct problem to be studied separately. Its solution is not involved in, nor affected by any theory we may frame to show in detail how our ideas grow and develop; and the fact that scientists employ a kind of mental short-hand to register and summarize a mass of data that would otherwise prove intractable because of its rich variety, is without any significance for or against the doctrine of natural realism; unless, of course, we should be so narrow as to understand by knowledge explanation only, in which case we should be guilty, with many others, of confounding a particular part with the greater whole, of mistaking a profile for the full-faced portrait of reality. Many a man has lost his faith in realism through exclusive attention to the fact that the human mind is a great productive and constructive power. It is time to awaken from this hypnotic sleep, to recover from this partial eclipse of consciousness. There is another side altogether to knowledge; we not only *produce* our ideas, we also *undergo* them; acquisition precedes elaboration and development.

The scientist is the latest to join the already great number

of those who can see but one side to human knowledge. He found himself an idealist, almost without knowing it, the moment he mistook his own particular theory of the nature of scientific knowledge for a real limitation of man's knowing powers in general. This mistake came from overemphasizing one fact at the expense of another fully as great and equally entitled to consideration. For instance: the much heralded fact that knowledge is subject to internal laws of growth and development is perfectly compatible with the ignored companion-fact that knowledge also has an extrinsic source and norm, being determined, in part, at any rate, by its objects, and never completely escaping the prod of an external stimulus. So far from being exclusive, as is so often alleged, these two facts are complementary in their mutual bearing. Reality and Knowledge are as two concentric circles, a wheel within a wheel, the former the greater, the latter the smaller of the two. The circumference of neither can be made to coincide with that of the other, though it is the end and aim of idealism to bring this coincidence about by inflating the inner to the size and sweep of the outer ring. Only by so doing can room be made for the exclusive doctrine of immanence, and all objects, known and knowable, be brought entirely within the charmed circle of mind, conveniently inflated for their reception and inclosure. But this inflating process is all on paper, and does not succeed in point of fact, the reason for the failure being that the outward relations of human thought to objects cannot be included under any system which says that the mind of man is in relation only with itself. To just such a process of inflating, ignoring, and overlooking does the fallacy of considering a theory of knowledge equivalent to a theory of reality owe its persistent reappearance in the pages of philosophy and science.

The Principle of Thought Economy.

Strange to say, history repeats itself even in the general *principle* which these recent scientific converts to pragmatism

invoke to rid themselves of the encumbering notion of an independent physical world, with which their formulas would have, of necessity to be in strict accordance. To justify their rejection of this realistic notion, and also to prove their right to substitute in its stead the more easily managed world of human sensations, they fall back on the already over-worked principle of Thought-Economy, better known as 'Ockam's razor' or the law of parsimony,[1] which forbids in a scientific explanation the use of all unnecessary suppositions, and lays down the rule that of two explanatory theories the more simple one is also the more true. From this selective principle, as if it were the final and only criterion of truth that could be said, of right, to demand conformity with its pronouncements, the conclusion is drawn—a supposition, by the way, from another unproven supposition—that the notion of a perceived, independent world of things, really distinct from our sensations of it, is an unnecessary, superfluous assumption for scientists to entertain.

Kant thought so, too, and the student of the history of philosophy will easily recognize in the foregoing line of reasoning a rather belated revival of the old argument by which Kant sought to displace the doctrine of physical realism, and to secure a solid footing at the same time for the doctrine of critical idealism which he proposed to establish in its stead. But the father of German philosophy evidently forgot that a limited principle, like Ockam's, cannot be *extended* to a special case, such as that of the realistic notion of an independently existing physical world, unless that case is first shown to fall well within the sphere of application to which the operation of the mental law in question is necessarily confined. It is easy for a man to be right in his general principle, and wrong in his particular instance, and the present case goes far toward showing that it is also equally easy for a man to be wrong in both. Kant seems to have regarded Ockam's famous maxim with all the fondness Archimedes had for his lever, when he said of it: "Give me where I may stand, and I will move the

[1] **Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate.**

world." But the trouble is in finding just such a point of vantage for the accomplishment of this ambitious design.

As a protest against extreme formalism, such as that which the Scotists practised when they needlessly multiplied metaphysical entities, and created more difficulties by their explanations than existed in the original facts to be explained, the principle of simplification which Ockam introduced had much to be said in its favor at the time. But the process of simplifying suppositions may easily be pushed too far, and made to exclude as useless any and all metaphysical attempts to account for the notion of external reality which is clearly one of the original data furnished by consciousness; in other words, the rules for explaining reality may be misused to explain it away. Philosophers are prone to forget, as did Kant, that Ockam's maxim is neither a necessity of thought, nor yet a limitation imposed by experience. Were it proven veritably to be a *universal rational principle,* which manifestly it is not, we might hesitate before denying its relevancy and applicability to the doctrine of realism. But since it is on this prior question of *the right to extend* a limited principle that the whole argument against realism clearly hinges and depends, we are left pretty much in the air, not only by Kant himself, but by his latter-day revivers as well.

What necessity is there, whether of thought or fact, compelling us to think of the universe as simple rather than complex, as individual rather than dual in its structure, as organic "unity-in-difference" rather than a system of distinct persons and things? The supposition that only a world of sensations need be reckoned with is, of course, more simple than the supposition that there is an additional world of things to be taken into account, because in the latter case duality is implied, and in the former some sort of monism. But what obliges us to choose either of these alternatives of simplicity or duality in preference to the other? That is the heart of the whole issue. What logical or real compulsion is there to accept for guidance in this choice of alternatives the well-worn adage of Ockam, which was intended originally for the inventors

of minute realities that did not exist, and has no meaning when applied to the great world of reality about us which we do not invent, but discover? None. The compulsion is all the other way. The facts of experience and the testimony of consciousness are a standing protest against the attempt of Kant and the pragmatists to put the moderate and the extravagant realists in one and the same boat, and to sink them both together with a single shot of criticism. The facts of experience and the testimony of consciousness are also a perpetual protest in this particular instance against the venturesome supposition that the doctrine of Monism, because more simple, is, by that fact alone, made more true than the more complex doctrine of dualism.[2]

The Doctrine of Simplicity.

Alas! the worship of simplicity, which is only another name for monism, has all the force and attraction of a religion with modern philosophers; and complexity, duality of any kind, is banished as a superstition. Simplicity, they tell us, forbids the useless doubling of the universe into a world of sensations, and a world of things. Like Thoreau when dying, they would be troubled with but one world at a time, and would justify this exclusiveness of taste, when pressed for a rational account of their attitude, by an appeal to their favorite doctrine of the simplicity of truth, and the truth of simplicity. It is interesting to think in this connection how different might have been the course of modern philosophers had this presupposition been examined and properly discounted, instead of having been uncritically accepted and admiringly glorified. Surely, the meaning cannot be that the adage of Ockam is of more binding force than the testimony of consciousness regarding the existence of an outer and real world! And yet, that seems to be the

[2] The *fact* of Dualism is not refuted by refuting the *theories*. Idealists invariably proceed to refute the psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological theories of Dualism under the false impression that the fact is thereby overthrown.

surprising sense in which idealists have always interpreted the so-called law of parsimony or economical thought; with them the simple passes for the true, and the complex for the illusory, at least until it has been reduced to its supposed original simplicity. Hegel tried to write history as if all were mind and nothing matter. An attempt was made by Spencer to read even prehistory in the light of Ockam's formula, when he reduced religion to its crudest terms, and argued that the lowest forms must also have been the first to occur historically. The axiom of simplicity is carried into other fields, especially into that of the Scripture, where a host of writers are to-day engaged in the hunt for simple forms of thought and expression, on the gratuitous supposition that our Lord's words, say, at the Last Supper, or on the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Coming, could not have been complex, but must have been simple in their original utterance and bearing. Proof of the necessity of any such supposition in each individual case is generally conspicuous by its absence. Nor need we be unduly surprised thereat, for the very existence of the physical world is sacrificed to-day in the name of this Moloch of Ockam's, and we are now told, largely on its unsupported authority, that sensations make the only world we either can, or need care to know; and all because Explanation is put before Knowledge instead of after.

But what interests us principally in the present situation of thought, which we have just been engaged in describing, is the significant fact that the latest repudiators of the doctrine of external perception have but freshly reproduced the mistakes of those who long ago preceded them in the ways of idealism, seeing only the developing side of human knowledge, harping on this half-truth as if it completely exhausted the subject, and then turning around contemptuously to deny the existence of any ready-made world. After this recital of the present trend and triumph of idealistic thought, we may well ask ourselves if the arguments urged against external perception and the known reality of the physical universe do not illustrate and exemplify a great fallacy rather than disestablish a truth

as old as philosophy itself. And this brings us by slow, perhaps also by illuminating stages to the discussion of the question proper.

Two Methods of Procedure.

The problem of perception has both a conscious and an unconscious side—the former an evident fact of psychology that shines by its own light, the latter an inevident physiological process on which an artificial light has to be thrown. Two distinct lines of inquiry branch out naturally from this double phase of the problem; we may ask *what* we perceive, or *how* our perceptions occur.

The answer to the first question, What? is made by psychology, and consists in the frank acknowledgment that we actually perceive external objects, this admission amounting to no more in the end than an explicit statement of the consciously experienced result of perception in all minds. There can be no legitimate doubt of the witness of psychology to this fact of external perception. The data of individual experience, if not darkened by the counsel of the critic beforehand, leave no real room for doubting that the primary object of knowledge is, not sensation, but objects or their qualities. The only plausible way to discredit this plain fact of psychology is to attempt to go behind it in some manner or other, and to employ metaphysics, or the natural sciences, or physiology for the purpose of depriving it of all real worth and significance. To this roundabout method of evasion the opponents of realism have always had recourse, never more so, perhaps, than at the present hour of writing. Idealist and pragmatist alike endeavor to circumvent the evidence by appealing from it to supposedly prior stages or conditions of our mental life, where it is not to be found. This appeal is sometimes confined to the sphere of consciousness, as when we are given to understand by the pragmatist that there existed in original man, and still exists in the mind of the babe, a state of pure experience where everything appears as a perfect blank, and none of the distinctions, later drawn between subject and object, self and

not-self, have as yet made their indelible scribings on the virgin page of consciousness. Sometimes the appeal is carried completely over into the region of the unconscious, and the evidence of our knowledge of reality is made to depend entirely on the inevidence of the physiological processes which go before or along with it. In either case the appeal is to a silent court, the decisions of which are not handed down, but framed beforehand by the appellant to suit himself. The first of these appeals does not rightly belong here for consideration. The second alone invites our attention at present—the attempt, namely, to discredit the matter of our perceptions by contrasting it with the manner of our perceiving.

The answer to the second question, How do these real perceptions occur? takes us out of the range of conscious knowledge altogether, and compels us to reconstruct, by means of science and analytic reason, those underlying processes of nerve and brain which do not, at the time of their happening, appear above the surface of consciousness as public events of which we are aware, but pass unnoticed beneath, playing a rôle of such complete self-effacement that not a glimmer of conscious light is left burning on their trail. Which of these two sides of the problem—the conscious result of perception, or the unconscious processes underlying and conditioning it—deserves to occupy the first place in philosophic attention? The settlement of this priority of claim to consideration confronts us at the very threshold of the problem, and must be decided one way or the other, before we are at liberty to proceed further in the discussion of the subject.

Shall we imitate Descartes, and begin by entertaining provisional doubt concerning the known results of perception, until we have examined the unknown processes, and satisfied all our theoretical misgivings as to the reliability of the previous sense-channels, through which our knowledge of reality comes? Or, shall we accept the results straightway at the outset, and then turn about to consider what additional information concerning the processes may be gathered from the positive sciences of physics and physiology? In plainer terms, which of these two

available lights is the ultimate one to be taken for guidance—the natural light of evidence, or the artificial light of explanation? On the answer to this question depends the choice of roads to idealism, or beyond it to the world of independent reality. We are at the dividing of the ways.

The realist regards the perceptive power of human consciousness as an ultimate or irreducible fact; one, that is, which can not be reduced to more simple, or explained in more intelligible terms than itself. There is no possible way by which we may go around, or under, or ahead of the simple fact of experience that we and the objects of our attention are really different items in the universe; that somehow we do know a reality that is not identical with ourselves, or with the consciousness of the race. This fact has to be accepted at once on its own evidence just as it stands. Everybody understands the meaning of an existing world of things, and recognizes his actual ability to perceive such a world, those alone excepted who practice the art of self-sophistication in preference to that of knowledge, who so train themselves to marvel at the obvious that they end by seeing a metaphysical impossibility where there is only an attested and accomplished psychological fact.

The history of idealism for the past three hundred years has all too plainly shown that no philosopher who disregarded or refused this light of evidence ever succeeded afterwards in making his way to reality. Hooded this light may be at times by the screening effect of theories advanced to account for it, or rather to explain it away, but extinguished never. Interesting sidelights of explanation may be thrown upon it, but these can no more take its place than a candle that of the sun. Nothing more illuminating than this conscious evidence has been discovered by its many critics, though scarcely a nook or corner of man's mental life has been left unexplored. Why, then, one may well ask these worshippers of the light that fails, should the acceptance of the results of perception be postponed until the processes themselves have been laid bare to scrutiny? No legitimate purpose is served by the adoption of any such Fabian policy of delay, but, on the contrary, a fictitious prob-

lem is created, and a real one ignored, by the very attempt to postpone the inevitable. The facts of experience, when completely stated, as they should be before we begin to treat them methodically, absolutely forbid our separating the process of perception from its product or result. The physiological argument against realism owes, as we shall see, all its insidious plausibility to this fallacy of wrenching apart and separating things that belong unitedly together; it loses its apparent strength, when the false gap, opened up between product and process is closed, that is, when the evidence is reported and stated as a whole, instead of being arbitrarily split, as it is by all idealists, into incomplete, opposing halves. Let us at least start with a real problem, one that grows out of our actual experience, not one that is created by our desire to be methodical rather than open-minded and receptive.

Should Criticism Displace Evidence?

The simple facts which give rise to the problem of procedure here under fire are these: in the act of perception, objects are present *to* consciousness, and are seen outside; in the act of reflection which follows, objects are present *in* consciousness, and are contemplated under the relation of this inner or immanent presence. There is therefore a dual aspect to human consciousness; it is plainly self-transcendent as well as self-referent; it has external no less than internal relations; its power ranges outward to things, and is not confined to inward acts of self-contemplation. This double fact affords all the proof really needed to show that consciousness is primarily the instrument, not the object of knowledge; that sensation is not a *limiting term* at which consciousness is always and forever forced to stop, but rather an *enabling means* by which the mind enters into communication with a reality distinct from, external to, and independent of itself. Can this double fact be simplified? Can these two aspects of consciousness be reduced to one? That is the problem which the facts create, or rather, which the idealist *thinks* they create, because for the

realist such a problem is fictitious, arising only when we ourselves summon it into being by the biassed prejudgment that knowledge must have only one side, and cannot possibly have two. The result of this high-handed procedure is to create a false opposition between the internal and the external aspects of consciousness, and to compel the latter to justify itself by means of the former—a manifest impossibility, and a preposterous problem, in the original meaning of this much abused word.

The realist sees no reason for bristling up with suspicions all aroused in the presence of the given fact that we know objects distinct from our sensations and ideas. The beginnings of our knowledge are neither the time nor the place for the exercise of our powers of suspicion, doubt, or criticism, but rather for their suspension. Critical questions cannot and should not be introduced at this initial stage, not only because they are conspicuously out of place, but also because neither criticism nor explanation can, by any manner of means, be made to precede the evidence, to anticipate it, or to function vicariously in its stead; for clearly, before the data of consciousness are studied, there are no facts, but only a lot of preliminary fictions, for criticism to work upon, and these are surely no fit substitutes for the evidence plainly put before us by consciousness. It would have been much better therefore for philosophy if the assumed necessity for doubting everything in advance had itself been made a matter of doubt, instead of being erected into a dogmatic preamble to all subjects of philosophic inquiry. There are some cases to which the Cartesian method of provisional doubt is inapplicable, and no idealist has ever paused long enough to inquire if the present case fell under the head of an exception to his favorite rule.

The realist does not object to the employment of criticism during the later stages of knowledge, to sift subjective elements from real, for there is no doubt that such a winnowing process is necessary, since the mind does not take up the objective order of things in a photographic flash, and errors of judgment are always a contingency to be reckoned with. But knowl-

edge is not merely a constructive activity, it is also an apprehensive power. These two functions go together as mutual companions, but that does not mean that Nisus is Euryalus, or Damon, Pythias. Each is clearly entitled to distinct treatment, for the reason that the construction which ever goes on in knowledge is an accompaniment of the process of knowing, and not the whole thing. The point which the realist wishes to make is that criticism cannot be extended to this perceptive or apprehensive power of consciousness, so as to envelop it with the same anticipative doubt as its companion-process of imaging or representing the known. There is no parity between the two cases. We are conscious of knowing (perceiving) objects externally present, before we become conscious that the mind has also represented them by an image within itself, which adds an inner presence for reflection to the outer presence of which alone perception takes hold. Knowledge is therefore more than a mere process of imaging or representing, and it is "this little more and how much it is" which condemns the representative theory of knowledge as about the most prejudiced account that could be taken of the matter, and the most dangerous kind of quicksand on which to lay the foundations of philosophy.

The theory that knowledge is reducible to a *mere* function of copying explains why modern philosophers insist on writing critical prefaces to the self-introducing facts of consciousness, why they accept the immanence of objects and deny their externality, why they prefer sophistication to evidence, why they begin to philosophize by discussing abstract possibilities instead of accepting concrete facts. Now the fact that philosophy starts with evidence rather than with criticism does not compel it to remain uncritical ever afterwards—a sort of rustic attitude adopted in the beginning and never overcome to the very end. But the persistent prejudice of idealists that philosophy should start with criticism rather than with evidence really cuts philosophy off thereafter from all healthy contact with the well-spring and controlling principle of objective experience. There is a lost sense of actuality pervading the writings of

idealists, which no amount of roundabout reasoning can successively conceal or overcome. An attempt is made to cover up this defect, and to restore the broken connection, by the theory that truth is, after all, only the experience of the individual made over and corrected by the enlightened experience of the race. But this belated admission of social agreement as the criterion of truth, so far from relieving the unnaturalness of the situation, only serves to bring it out into still bolder relief. For what, pray, is this description of truth but an incomplete account of the internal relations of human experience as a whole, with the external relations of that whole to reality left out of the reckoning unconsidered?

The idealist thus ends his philosophy by stating and proving the existence of a problem, which he refused to admit when he started out, namely, the problem of the relations of Knowledge to Reality. A strange state of affairs, a peculiar pass indeed, to find a problem ignored at the beginning more clamorous than ever for solution at the end, and denied that solution, because it is complacently supposed to have been already solved, when the fact of the matter is that it has only been stated over again more clearly than ever. Banquo's ghost returns to the feast, to torment the intellectual patricians responsible for "the deep damnation of his taking off." Could any better proof than this be asked for the old scholastic thesis that the immediate perception of reality, the evidence of consciousness to a known and knowable world, is a fact which needs no introductory preface, and brooks no delay in acceptance on our part.

Curiosity Versus Skepticism.

This view of perception as an ultimate fact to be admitted at once on its own evidence without preliminary explanation, the idealist refuses to share. According to him the question of possibility takes precedence over the question of fact, and the knowableness of reality has to be first established before actual knowledge of it can be scientifically admitted. This premature adoption of a critical attitude, not only makes a

philosophical mystery out of a plain fact of psychology, but also relies on the glaring fallacy of separatism for its justification. For instance, the two questions of fact and possibility, though distinguishable, are not separable in treatment. The separation of these two questions is decidedly against the empirical evidence which answers both at once, impliedly at least; and also against the laws of logic, which plainly show that possibility presupposes reality, and that a derivative notion like the former cannot be employed to criticize and undermine a primary notion like the latter. *A posse ad esse non valet illatio.* But let this high-handed procedure in inverting the given order of experience, and the logical priority of original notions over derivative, pass without further comment for the moment. Another question presses. The idealist contends that such an extraordinary fact—he alone has made it so by investing it with spurious mystery—as the mind's power to transcend itself and veritably perceive external reality, should not be accepted without having been previously explained. All facts of experience, it is claimed, need explanation, and none more so than the first with which human knowledge is supposed to begin.

It all depends on what is here meant by 'explanation.' The term may imply a sincere desire to know more about the details, accessories, and incidentals of this self-transcendent power of consciousness, or an ulterior design to find some way of getting rid of it altogether; in other words, the inspiring motive may be either legitimate curiosity, or downright skepticism. That the desire to know more about a thing may be cleverly feigned to hide a skeptical intention, anybody can clearly see for himself who first takes the pains to inquire whether it is possible to entertain a universal methodical doubt. Clearly everything cannot be doubted, everything cannot be explained. We have a rational assurance of first principles and fundamental facts to which no validation-process is applicable, because the assurance in question is as prominent in our denials as in our attempted proofs, and stares back at us in either case like an untroubled sunbeam from waters which we have stirred and sullied. Suspicion rightly attaches to those who endeavor to

make their doubts universal in sweep, proving by reason that we should renounce reason, showing by explanation that the original fact to be explained has disappeared, blissfully imagining that, if the objective reference attached to all perceptions can be identified with some purely inner feature of experience, say, with our percepts rather than with the perceived, the case against realism is argued and won.

Such men do not effectually conceal their hand when playing the game of methodical doubt, and advocating experimentation to the utter exclusion of introspection. It is not explanation, but elimination for which they are really holding out. This skeptical intention may not be formal or explicit; it is enough that it be objectively implied in the rules under which the so-called game of explanation is to be played. To start out with the preconceived idea that Reality is either Thought or Experience, as idealists and pragmatists do; and to accept as the guiding principle of research that Explanation alone is Knowledge, how, pray, can such prejudices as these be otherwise rightly described than as skeptical attitudes? It is this indefensible method of prejudging the *nature,* instead of first investigating the *facts* of human cognition, which secures for idealism the winning hold it seems to have on the minds of many. "The not distinguishing where things should be distinguished, and the not confounding where things should be confounded," says old John Selden, "is the cause of all the mistakes in the world." The everlasting attempts at fusion, reduction, and simplification going on in the philosophy of the hour are the best indication of the truth of this apothegm. The Schoolmen knew how to distinguish without separating, and thus escaped the perpetual treadmill of Monism, into which, it would seem, by making confusion worse confounded, modern philosophy has fallen. There are some questions which answer themselves, because they are questions only in form. And knowledge is one of these, until we seek to confound it with something altogether incidental, with the merry-go-round process of mere symbols, with explanation, purpose, or utility, and, by this attempted transfer of identity from whole to part,

make knowledge appear as a huge impostor—forgetting that our suspicions themselves may be the one rightful object of suspicion. Philosophy must have its Frankenstein, it would seem, not to be outdone by literature.

The ulterior design of anti-realist philosophers is, therefore, not to explain the self-transcendent character of consciousness, but to explain it away, so as to leave not even a wrack behind. It seems to them absurdity personified that the human mind should have for its objects outer things no less than inner impressions. Such a mental leap out of one's self into the great beyond ought to leave some record or traces in reflection, if it be the notorious fact which realists claim. But reflection, so far from countenancing any such extraordinary occurrence, is altogether silent concerning it. Some way must therefore be found for eliminating this paradox, some means devised for reducing to more elementary terms the realistic notion that consciousness has reference to objects distinct from itself. A separatist conception of sensation furnishes the means desired. Accordingly sensation is viewed in complete abstraction and severance from reason which always accompanies it in man. The result of this abstract, incomplete way of regarding sensation is naturally the disappearance of all objective reference, because the latter is due to reason and sense working unitedly together, and, of course, fails to appear when a division of labor is surreptitiously introduced. But room has to be created for an idealistic interpretation of consciousness, and the end here justifies the means. Having secured a start by the trick of stating the facts and factors incompletely, the idealist next detaches objective reference from perceptual experience, and triumphantly exhibits it as an appurtenance of conceptual thought alone. Instead of pointing to the perceived, as it actually does, the objective reference now points only from concepts to percepts, and the transcendence of consciousness fades away into a mental echo of absent objects, no longer indicating a cognitive relation to objects actually present and perceived. This restrictive interpretation of objective reference converts the act of knowing into the objects of knowledge,

identifies experience with reality, and blots out the physical universe from consideration altogether.

Immanence Versus Transcendence.

Reviewed in order, the statements of the preceding paragraph represent conclusions distilled out of the fallacious method of separatism rather than inferences scientifically established. Not a shred of proof is anywhere advanced, the whole question is begged. First of all, with regard to the negative argument drawn from the silence of reflection concerning a perceived and perceivable world of things, that was made a matter of special inquiry in a previous study,[3] and need not detain us further here. It was there shown that the attempt to contract consciousness into sensation and to limit knowledge to acts of self-reflection was a deliberate evasion of the entire perceptive stage of experience which precedes the formal exercise of our reflective powers. Furthermore, that it was based on a misconception of the function of reason as following instead of accompanying the work of sense, this division of the mind's labor being both untrue to fact and false in principle. It is simply a case of calling the wrong witness to testify.

The second part of the argument rehearsed is apparently more serious. It represents a positive attempt to reduce to absurdity the common-sense doctrine of consciousness by showing that the so-called external reference of thought is only from one point within experience to another further back, or higher up, but not to anything beyond or outside at all. Can the conviction which we all have of the transcendent power of consciousness be thus made to vanish through the agency of some exorcising formula of explanation? That is the question brought before us, and we propose to let the idealist furnish the proof of the possibility of accomplishing any such task.

[3] *The Catholic University Bulletin*, June, 1910, "Reality from the Critic's Standpoint."

He has been so long engaged in the work of providing substitutes for the external world that one's curiosity is whetted to know if his mimicking 'understudies' can play the heavy rôle assigned them, and still leave nothing lacking in the performance.

The absolute idealist interprets objective reference as wholly an inward, and in no sense an outward relation. For him there is no fact, being, or thing which does not fall within the circumference of mind, or which may be said to lie outside what Bradley calls 'psychic existence.' Matter as such, mind as such, are abstractions, which have no existence apart. There is no such thing, therefore, as an independently existing object, whether material or mental. Mind is the sole reality—mind existing under the two indivisible aspects of spirit and matter; and, consequently, what we know is, not independent, but related reality. Consciousness indeed refers to objects, but these are within itself, not in another order of existence all their own. Its so-called transcendence is, not the power of knowing an external world of things, but of discovering within itself a divine world of ideas. The reference is not to something beyond at all. It means, not that an independent physical world, but that an absolute divine mind, is really before us, making itself directly known to human spectators. Instead, therefore, of perceiving individual objects externally present, we are rather being bought face to face with the intellectual structure of reality itself in our acts of perception.

Does this extension of the theory of immanence, so as to bring all real objects wholly within the mind, actually amount to the reduction or simplification of consciousness intended? Is it really a successful explanation of the fact of transcendence? Or, is it merely the substitution of an inner and more mysterious transcendence still for that external reference which attaches to all our knowledge? The latter. The desired reduction is as far off as ever. The immanence of all objects in consciousness is first *assumed.* and then *employed* to explain the fact of transcendence. But the fact overlaps the explanation altogether, and remains more conspicuously than ever

outside its reach. This is not the place to go into a detailed refutation of idealism. Our sole concern at present is with the question whether idealists have succeeded in reducing to lower terms the fact of the self-transcendence of human consciousness, which our perceptive acts reveal. The answer must be decidedly in the negative, for the convincing reason that the notion of externality which we all have with regard to perceived objects, could never have arisen in consciousness, much less be accounted for afterward, if the idealist's doctrine of the immanence of all reality in mind were true. The very fact that we have such a notion, that it is an essential part of the disclosure made by consciousness, and that idealists perpetually ignore or overlook it, is a sufficient commentary on their inability to face the problem which its presence raises. Immanence is neither the first, nor the last impression which we receive of reality. The most ultimate notion of all is left out of the idealist system.

The Failure of Immanence.

The boasted reduction of consciousness from "a one-to-two to a one-to-one" relation thus turns out to be nothing more than the substitution of immanence for self-transcendence, or rather for external reference. This substitution is not equivalent to reduction. Insuperable facts stand in the way of its actually being or ever becoming such. First of all, the actual presence of objects *to* consciousness, when we perceive, is neither reduced, eliminated, nor explained by pointing to the presence of these same objects *in* consciousness, when we reflect. These two relations of presence, outer and inner, cannot be made to merge in one. Polaric in their opposition, they are incapable of changing places, or of assuming each other's rôles. So true is this that, to nullify its pertinent significance, idealists invent the theory that all relations are intrinsic, thus reviving extravagant realism in their efforts to avoid moderate. But try as they may, the meaning of the prepositions 'in' and 'to' in this connection remains irreducibly opposed. Even

in the revealed doctrine of the Trinity, where the relations and the substance inwardly related are infinite, these two aspects still defy all our attempts at reduction.

Our perceptive acts bring us face to face with the presence of something more than a Relation, and that something more is Reality. The philosopher never lived who could rid himself of the idea of this 'something-more-than-a-mere-relation,' seen through relation itself; and no realist ever held, what the straw man usually buffeted by the critics is made to hold, that the notion of a reality not ourselves came to us in any other way than through the channel of mutual relatedness and relationship. Instead of being the term and limit of our perceptual knowledge, relation is disclosed to us in experience rather as the manner and means and condition of our knowing something else besides ourselves. The fact that we can know only related things does not in the least imply that we can know relations only. It implies that we can know reality, if we know it at all, only through the relations of self-manifestation which it has and sustains to ourselves. And this fact has no favorable significance whatsoever for idealism, although it is usually quoted as if it put the realist to the rack. It proves, this fact of interrelationship, not that relation pure and simple is the object of human knowledge, but rather that relation is the appointed means of all our knowing, whether it be ourselves or something else that is known. It is only by converting a means into a disability, a method into a limitation, a street into a blind-alley that the idealist is enabled to cut the human mind off from all relations to independent reality. No real reduction has taken place at all. Things remain just as they were before. The external reference is still there unexplained, and so is the physical world to which that reference points. All that has happened, if we may speak of such a thing as happening, is that "absolute mind" has been made to take the place of the world of things. The forbearance and moderation of scholastic realism is succeeded by the intemperance of Gnosticism.

To maintain his favorite thesis that it is a spiritual, not

a physical world which we perceive, the idealist is put to severe straits. He uses the words "mental" and "physical" as interchangeable, in utter despite of the fact that these two words made a distinction which no man, plain or polished, fails to recognize. He has to hold that we know the minds of our fellow-men directly, though it is clear that only by way of analogy and inference can any such knowledge be gained. Confronted by the objection that it is absurd to maintain a direct power of scrutinizing the minds of others, man or brute, the idealist falls back on the vague theory that consciousness was 'social' from the beginning. But even this theoretical place of refuge is denied him, for, when he tries to think this social theory out into explicit and definite particulars, nothing survives but words. And, if it be the distinguishing trait of the mental that it is not open to direct general inspection, but only to that of its "private proprietors," what shall we think of the idealist's attempt to deny to the Divine Mind that privacy which we are all forced to acknowledge as distinctive even of the human? "We perceive trees and houses," says Professor Fullerton pointedly in this connection; "we infer our neighbor's sensations and ideas." [4] Evidently the idealist is hard pressed to maintain the spirituality of the world. Externality has such a peculiar feline habit of returning.

Has the pragmatist, with his gospel of universal relativism, succeeded any better than his elder idealist brother, with whom he is at such bitter odds? There is this to be said of the latter: while an opponent of external reference, he always believed that experience transcended the fleeting impressions of the moment, and pointed to something of the very eternities themselves. This partial compliment cannot be paid to the pragmatist, whose avowed purpose it is to banish all permanent or absolute features from human thought, to do away with transcendence altogether, and to seek nothing more ultimate than the 'experience of the perceptive moment.' Thus Professor James explains 'objective reference' as 'a mere incident of

[4] *Essays Philosophical and Psychological*, "The New Realism," p. 24.

the fact that so much of our experience comes as insufficient, and is of process and transition." [5] In other words, the so-called reference is, not to any distinctly perceived objects at all, but to experiences once had, which thought retrospectively considers and overhauls. Professor Strong is inclined to think that perceptibility, not actual perception is all that is implied.[6] Likewise Professor Dewey, who leans to the opinion that memory has something to do with the matter, because it not only recalls past events, but at the same time anticipates their future recurrence.[7] Objective reference is thus interpreted, not as a cognitive relation through which things are known, but as a mere matter of functional utility, prevailing between concepts and percepts, the former being regarded as instruments or tools for fashioning and shaping the latter. All relation to the perceived has thus been made to disappear.

The most striking feature about all these pragmatic accounts is the studied attempt to transfer 'objective reference' from our perceptive acts, where it is more to be found than elsewhere, to the reflective memory which recalls the past and anticipates the future. The problem of knowledge is thus made falsely to appear as a problem of absent rather than of present objects, and knowing sinks at once to the level of a form of musing. The result of this arbitrary mode of procedure is naturally, as has been said, the substitution of possibility for fact, of perceptibility for actual perception. At most, it is with possible 'brain-events' not with external objects, that our acts of perception are or can be concerned. But this shortening of 'objective reference' is a begging of the whole question. Restrictive interpretations such as these should be justified in advance by proofs of the restriction, and yet not a semblance of argument to this effect is anywhere to be found among these writers, who first gratuitously assume that consciousness is identical with sensation, and then use this unproven assumption to disestablish the fact of objective reference. What is offered

[5] *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 117.
[6] *Journal of Phil., Psy. and Sc. Methods*, 1904, pp. 543 ff.
[7] *Ibid.*, 1907, p. 259.

as a solution is therefore no solution at all, but an unsupported prejudgment of the whole nature of consciousness and of knowledge. For if consciousness is distinct from its objects, objective reference is all that these men say, and something more besides into the bargain. That consciousness is so distinct, may be seen from the fact that sensation is not always the object, but sometimes also the instrument of our knowledge—a telescope, not a mere shimmering camera. And just as one might wrongly expect to be rewarded with the vision of stars if he looked at a telescope and not through it, the same may be said with equal force of those philosophers who look at sensation and not through it to the world beyond. Who has ever proved that consciousness is a stained glass rather than a transparent window? or that, if betimes our gaze should happen to rest on the window, the panes marked the limit of our power of seeing?

A Peculiar Cross-Purpose.

There is, therefore, plain to be seen, a large residuum of fact left over unassimilated and unexplained by all these theories. Idealists and pragmatists are both "short in their accounts," and a shortage always calls for additional explanation and still further investigation. They have made the problem smaller than it really is, and put forth the explanation of a part, as if it actually amounted to an explanation of the whole. They have not diminished one whit the externality of objects to consciousness; they have merely stated without proof the immanence of all objects in mind, and made this favorite prejudice of theirs an article of faith. The very liberties which they are forced to take with ordinary experience and the accepted meaning of language go clearly to show that these critics of human knowledge have accepted the controlling influence of their own methodical prejudices rather than that of the empirical evidence which, in great part, they either dismiss or disregard. And the result could not well have been otherwise than it is. From being partial and not thorough in his preliminary survey of the problem, the idealist, or the prag-

matist, as the case may be, could not prevent his originally exclusive attitude towards the parts omitted from becoming more and more so, as he went along; and that, perhaps, explains why he thinks he is at the end of a problem when in very truth he is only at the beginning, having gone round all the while in a circle without really advancing a step. It is only by beginning with a completely stated analysis of the concrete, actual facts of perception that we can avoid running into the cross-purpose of ending one problem with the statement of another which we thought off our hands for good. Philosophic thought could never have come so deviously to such a signal defeat of its own intentions but for the premature raising of a question of possibility and the undue postponement of a question of fact. The critic believed he was solving two problems, when he was occupied only with one, and we accordingly invite him to take up the pretermitted problem of reality, and thus make amends in a measure for centuries of oversight and neglect. Neither as a concrete fact, nor even as an abstract conception has the self-transcendence of consciousness been reduced, or the objective reference of our knowledge been explained away. It still awaits its due meed of consideration; for it has given ample proof of its power to resist being made identical with anything else, and has shown a distinctness of individuality against its aggressors which no "merger theory" has been able to diminish, much less destroy. And for evidence of the truth of this latter statement, we appeal to the fact—made clear, we hope, by the foregoing criticism—that, in attempting to reduce to absurdity the realist's notion of a self-transcending consciousness, the idealist has actually put himself in the awkward position and undesirable category which he intended for the realist. It is a poor rule that does not work both ways.

What is Ultimate Knowledge?

Is external perception, then, an ultimate fact, shining by its own natural light of evidence, and needing no artificial light of explanation thrown upon it in advance to make it appear

more brilliant and acceptable in critical eyes? From all that has been said and argued, there can be no doubt that the answer must be affirmative. Why then is it that this fact is so persistently called in question, so unhesitatingly denied by philosophers of the modern school? The answer to this query is not far to seek, and, when discovered, lets in a flood of light on warring spirits. Some men there are who refuse to think unless they can do so in terms of the imagination. Thought pure and simple, the pale white light of reason, is not brilliant enough for such as these, and so they decompose it into some one of its accompanying colors. Thinking is perversely regarded as dead feeling, and they would galvanize it into life anew. Should you happen to mention the word 'reality' to men of this type, they turn upon you with a patronizing air, and ask, what does that *mean?* They know fully as well as you the meaning of the word, but they are not content with understanding simple meaning, they must also, it would seem, imagine and represent it, before they can be brought to the point of acceptance and admission. Simply to know is not enough for those who believe with Napoleon that imagination rules the world. They want to know what knowledge is *like,* before they will yield assent to its utterances.

Unwilling to consider knowledge as a process distinct from imagining and representing, they identify it with some form or other of these latter, and thus completely destroy its distinctive character. The majority of mankind want pictures, says Macaulay somewhere, and from present indications, it would seem that some of the enlightened minority desired them too. Otherwise how explain the constant efforts of idealists and pragmatists to translate into the visual imagery of sense the simple meanings which thought discovers everywhere? How account for the insistent demands made on the realist to show how the perception of reality may be imagined, to tell whether it is to be likened to a photographic process, a reaching out to the stars, or a physical 'grasping' of the things that lie about? How explain the expenditure of emotion for three centuries, and the mocking plaint over 'reality' as an

emaciated barebones and starveling? Is it not there, at any rate, whatever its condition be, thick or thin, rich or poor? And it is not known to be there, whether the manner of its making itself known to consciousness can be imaginatively reconstructed, or not? Should we not therefore face, instead of shirking the problem which this real presence raises? And if, as a matter of fact and experience, we apprehend the meaning of reality, are we at liberty to deny that we do, merely because, forsooth, we cannot reproduce in the imagination any colored likeness of the meaning? Suppose we could vividly reproduce in images all the simple meanings which we understand—eternity, say, and infinity, for instance, not to mention the contraband concept of 'reality'—would we know any more than we did previously, or merely have found illustrations of a very deficient sort for what we already knew?

Why all this appeal from thought to the 'sympathetic' imagination? Who has ever established the critical canon that human thought must have a dramatic quality before it can have the value of knowledge, or that visualizing is explanation, and illustration proof? Is it not high time that men should cease reaping a harvest of conclusions from the fallacious notion that thinking is only a dream of feeling, a pale replica of sense, and return to the true conception of it as an interpenetrative power working through sensation to something beyond, and not on sensation to something wholly within, as if all that thought did was to take a second impression fainter than the first, and give us ghosts instead of substantial realities for company? And if we correct this chronic misconception of the function of thought and reason, what becomes of the supposed ultimateness of the imagination, its supposed greater nearness to reality? It disappears at once with the misconception on which it is based. No scholastic realist holds that sense, apart from reason, knows reality; the knowledge of reality is due to the simultaneous functioning of these two distinct, but united powers; and that power is surely the ultimate one of the two, which goes further than the other, and is capable of understanding the real meaning of things other than itself. Because an

artist's brush acts between him and the picture which he is painting, one would hardly be justified in inferring that the brush was the principal agency concerned. And if art can work outward through instruments, and still retain its principalship, why cannot knowledge do the same? From the fact that I set myself to study the vehicles through which the notion of reality comes, it does not follow that I am obtaining a more intimate knowledge, or a more basic explanation than when I directly inspect the meaning conveyed through their agency to my scrutinizing intellect, which the French so aptly call 'the sense of the real.' It merely follows therefrom that I am wilfully seeking in instrumental processes below intellection illustrations of what has taken place, not in, but through them. How, pray, could I even attempt to reduce knowledge to another process altogether than that of apprehended meaning, if I did not already know what I was trying to reduce or relate to something else? The best witness for the defense in some cases is evidently the opposing counsel, and so it is in this particular instance, the prosecution developing the very point which it attacks, namely—the distinctive character of human knowledge as a simple apprehension of meaning.

Search the scriptures of idealism from Hegel to James, and the conclusion is borne in upon you that here are men who want illuminated meanings before they will consent to read the mind's message, who have fallen under the spell of picturesque thinking, and persuaded themselves into the belief that knowledge, when illustrated, is more ultimate than when it comes to us unadorned in the simple form of thought. Was it not Professor James who said that he could feel his 'ands' and 'buts' and 'fors,' thus substituting relations felt for relations known? It would make an interesting volume to collect the question-begging metaphors and images in which philosophers have sought refuge from a world which they did not create, and cannot make over to their suiting. What changes have been rung on the idea of imagination as painting, and of thought as sketching! How the representative theory of knowledge has led even the elect astray! How the effort to add a

colored supplement to thought has made the noblest of our faculties subservient to its ministers and handmaids! But we forbear further. Only one more thought remains to be added, and it is this: the concept of Existence means infinitely more than the mere existence of a Concept; Reality is not Knowledge.

> "We figure to ourselves
> The thing we like, and then we build it up
> As chance will have it, on the rock or sand;
> For thought is tired of wandering o'er the world,
> And home-bound fancy runs her bark ashore."

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

INTELLECTUALISM AND PRAGMATISM: THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Contemporary Philosophy has centered its thoughts on the theory of knowledge. It is the problem of the nature and value of knowledge—a problem which occupied so great a place in the philosophy of Greece with the Sophists, Plato, Aristotle and their respective theories of Skepticism or Relativism, Idealism and Realism, in the Philosophy of the Schoolmen with their theory of Universals, in the Philosophy of Kant with his Criticism of pure reason, of practical reason and of judgment,—that contemporary philosophy is subjecting anew to examination and to the solution of which it is looking as the key to the solution of the various problems of Psychology, Logic and Metaphysics.

While Aristotle, in opposition to Protagoras' relativism and Plato's idealism, and the great Schoolmen under the leadership of St. Thomas, in opposition to medieval ultra-realism and nominalism, solved the problem by appealing to both intuition and concepts as essential factors of human knowledge, and by assigning to each of these its true place, function and value, contemporary schools have separated these two elements. They have opposed one to the other and come to the conclusion that philosophy must ultimately be either a philosophy of mere concepts or a Philosophy of Pure Experience or Intuition,—Absolutism in one case, Pragmatism with Radical Empiricism or Intuitionism in the other.

Since our purpose is to present a criticism of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism and a defence of Realistic Intellectualism, it will be useful, for the sake of clearness, to begin by determining the meaning and content of these two terms.

Pragmatism is that philosophical theory which identifies truth with usefulness or practical consequences (the word "practical" being taken in its most general meaning and including intellectual satisfaction as well as particular results

of any kind); considers concepts and discursive reasoning as mere intellectual hypotheses devised by man, not to represent reality but to lead us to use and experience it; and points ultimately to immediate experience as the only way to reach the real. *Intellectualism,* as we take it here, namely Realistic Intellectualism, is that philosophical theory which defines truth as an agreement of the mind with reality and subordinates usefulness to truth; considers concepts and discursive reasoning as truly, although inadequately, representative of reality; and stands for intellectual or conceptual knowledge as superior to and explanatory of, although dependent on and derived from, empirical knowledge. In this theory, both intellectual and empirical elements are essential to true human knowledge.

In the first part of this paper we shall present, as exactly as we can, the pragmatist account of knowledge; and if it is true that the right understanding of a false system is half of its refutation, we shall have then done much by this exposition towards showing its erroneous principles. In the second part we shall point out its defects and fallacies, state and defend the intellectualistic theory of knowledge, as it is maintained in the traditional philosophy especially in Scholasticism.

Although we are not directly concerned here with Absolutism, it will be well, nevertheless, to state the general principles of this system, since Pragmatism presents itself largely as a reaction against it. Such a statement will have the twofold advantage of helping us to understand better, by contrast, the pragmatist theory and also to determine more precisely the moderate Intellectualism which we defend.

Strange as it may appear at first, both systems, Absolutism and Pragmatism, whatever may have actually been the more immediate or remote influences which have inspired them, are the logical development in different directions of Kant's philosophy.

The Genesis of Absolutism.

Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* had reached the conclusion that we perceive things, not as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us, as we make them; it is our reason,

with its concepts, that makes the cosmos. True it is that he speaks only of the phenomenal cosmos; that he maintains the existence of the noumenal cosmos (the thing-in-itself), in which all antinomies are reconciled, where the mechanism of pure reason and the teleologism of judgment are unified through immanent teleology which assimilates the final causes of nature with the efficient causes. There was, however, in this theory an impetus to go farther, and farther his successors went. Fichte identified the thing-in-itself with the Moral Ego, which produces the phenomenal world by a necessary act of creation, and overcomes it by a free act of effort. Schelling identified the thing-in-itself with the Absolute, the common source of the Ego and of the Non-Ego and transcendent to both. Finally, Hegel held that the Absolute, common source of the Ego and Non-Ego, is not transcendent, but immanent in them. It is not the principle from which nature and Ego proceed, but it is the very processes through which Nature and Ego proceed and evolve. Reality or the Absolute is one, and all things are but various stages of its realization. The Absolute is a becoming which has its end and rule immanent in itself. It is Reason, the Idea realizing itself through the various stages of inorganic and organic nature to end in consciousness and personality in man. Reason or the Idea is then both objective reality and subjective faculty, essence of things and form of thought. Hence the Kantian categories are not only an instrument of thought, they are the very substance of things. Thought and Reality, Logic and Metaphysics are identified. The Absolute is the synthetic unity of experience, the sum-total of reality, the ground of all things with structural differences.

These were the principles that influenced and animated the English neo-hegelian school with the Cairds, Green, McTaggart, Bradley, etc. . . . They have found their systematic expression in Mr. Bradley's philosophy as exposed in his work *Appearance and Reality* and more recently in divers articles in *Mind*.[1] Since Mr. Bradley is generally pointed to by Prag-

[1] "On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," N. S., No. 69; "On Truth and Coherence," *ibid.*, N. 71; "Coherence and Contradiction," *ibid.*, N. 72.

matists as the present leader of that school, the type of the "thought-minded" intellectualist, and his system considered as the genuine representative of Absolutism, it may be well to state briefly the fundamental propositions of his philosophical system.

The Absolutism of Mr. Bradley.

Postulating the existence of Reality and our power of knowing it, Mr. Bradley starts with two fundamental principles: the formal principle that *Reality is non-contradictory or self subsistent,* and the material principle that *Reality is sentient experience,* that is, is given in "this immediate unity which comes in feeling."[2] Hence comes the immediate conclusion that Reality is one, not many, for several realities must be independent; independence is irreconcilable with relation implied in plurality; and relation means inconsistency: Reality then is an individual organic whole, an Absolute all-inclusive and all-coherent. To comprehend this ultimate reality is the goal of philosophical knowledge. We must start with our sentient experience, for it is our only apprehension of reality. Our sentient experience is reality, since it is immediate and self-subsistent; but it is not absolute reality, since it is confused and subject to change: it asks for explanation. Judgment must intervene; "it transcends and must transcend the immediate unity upon which it cannot cease to depend"; it has to qualify it *ideally.*[3] In order to do this, it has to use *ideas* (an idea being "any part of the content of a fact, so far as that works out of immediate unity with its existence"),[4] to break up the unity of reality, to separate in it the existence and the content, the "that" and the "what," and to separate the content into its various elements. Thus judgment is essentially relational; it replaces the unity of reality by relations, both external and internal. But relation involves essentially

[2] *Mind,* N. S., N. 72, p. 497.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 498.
[4] *Appearance and Reality,* 1st ed., p. 163.

dependence and inconsistency (consistent meaning that which is consistent *with itself,* as contradictory is that which is inconsistent *with itself*). Judgment then and thought, ideas and relations, are merely "appearances," an appearance being "anything which comes short when compared with reality." [5] Thought therefore must attempt both to preserve the immediacy of unity and to maintain the result of analysis without its relational character. It must go beyond relations and appearances and transcend them; it must state the predicate ideally and include it in the subject, that is, predicate appearances of the subject or Reality in such a way that they may be conceived in it as integral parts of a Whole supremely individual, supremely independent, unrelational and coherent. Ultimate reality must indeed include appearances; otherwise it would not be self-consistent, since it would be either a thing-in-itself related to them or else it would not account for them. How is this possible? In order to be conceived as elements of ultimate reality, appearances must be *transmuted.* This is possible through the theory of the "degrees of Truth and Reality." We may remark that appearances are partly unreal and partly real. They are unreal as compared to the whole or total reality, that is, as appearances; they are real as existing, for "the absolute appears in its phenomena and is real nowhere outside them; it has no assets beyond appearances." [6] Their reality is measured and valued by their degree of comprehensiveness and coherence; their unreality may be corrected by supplementation and rearrangement. That appearances may be included and transmuted in Reality is possible, for there is no proof that any one of them is irreconcilable with the Absolute. On the other side, the Absolute demands that all shall be reconcilable, since it cannot be otherwise understood as consistent with itself. Therefore they must be transmuted, for "what may, if also must be, assuredly is." Thus all appearances can be and must be included and transmuted in the Absolute, and boldly but logically Mr. Bradley attempts to show how appear-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 485.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 489.

ances, like pain, evil, space, time, etc., are included in the Absolute. They are transmuted in such a way that they are in the Absolute, but ceasing to be pain "as such," evil "as such," etc. . . . "on the whole."[7] Their defect as mere appearances comes from their inconsistency, that is, from the fact that they were apart from the Whole; but, when considered in the Absolute as integral elements in the Whole, they are consistent. Thus, "all is appearance and no appearance or any combination of these is the same as reality," yet, "the Absolute is its appearances, it is really all and every one of them," although it is not "any one of them as such." Thus the Absolute is conceived as all inclusive, all-coherent, immanent within the Whole and distributing to each appearance its part of Reality and truth.[8]

Such a philosophy indeed, whether it is called Idealism or Absolutism, is the triumph of a priori concept and of purely logical construction over concrete reality and facts. Actual reality is consulted, but its answer is found deficient. In order to be true and absolute reality, it has to be transmuted into what my concepts demand for their consistency; it has to come to realize "somehow" what my concepts think as the Absolute consistency which "can be," "must be" and "so certainly is."[9] "This," Mr. Bradley says, "I take to be the way of philosophy, of any philosophy which seeks to be consistent. It is not the way of life or of common knowledge. . . ."[10]

The Reaction of Pragmatism and Empiricism Against Absolutism.

A reaction against such an extreme Idealism and ignoring of actual reality was to be expected; and it was not rash to conjecture that it would end in its extreme opposite, Nominalism, Empiricism or Intuitionism. And so it happened, at

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 486-487.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 199; see also p. 196.
[10] *Mind*, N. S., N. 72, p. 501.

first as a method of discerning truth from error under the name of Pragmatism, then as a Metaphysics of the nature of reality and of knowledge, under the name of Radical, Immediate Empiricism or Intuitionism.

As a priori Absolutism had sprung from Kant's critique of pure reason and of judgment, so Pragmatism, logically if not actually,—for many Pragmatists repudiate Kant's paternity,—was an application of the principles of the critique of practical reason. It appeared almost at the same time in various countries suggested by divers circumstances and subjected to different influences.

In English speaking countries, Pragmatism took more especially the character of a reaction against Idealism and of a return to empiricist Positivism. It defined itself as a philosophical protest against mere intellectual speculation in favor of the demands of practical life, as an appeal to concrete and particular realities against the invading of general notions and abstract speculations. It found its expressions in works such as James' " The Will to believe," " Pragmatism," etc. . . . , Schiller's " Axioms as Postulates," " Humanism " and " Studies in Humanism," Dewey's " Studies in Logical Theory," etc.[11]

On the Continent, it was more particularly interested in and influenced by the philosophy of sciences and the criticism of scientific notions and theories. It is found, in Germany, in the scientific studies of Mach and Ostwald, in R. Avenarius' empirio-criticism, in Simmel's " Philosophie des Geldes," etc. . . , in France in the philosophy of Bergson and of his school.

In the present paper, we are concerned only with its notion of concept and its theory of experimental knowledge.

[11] Those who wish to have a clear view of the pragmatist movement in England and America will have to consult also the numerous articles which have filled the philosophical magazines of the last ten years, especially *Mind, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, The Philosophical Review*, etc. . .

The Pragmatist Notion of Concept.

A point on which all Pragmatists agree concerning the notion of concept (and the same may be said of judgment which is made of concepts), is that its primary function and meaning is not one of representation, but one of practical value and usefulness. Concepts, according to Pragmatism, are above all means and instruments devised by man, under the influence of his practical needs, to handle reality.

According to the French school, common needs of daily life, the scientific aspiration to dominate nature and foresee its course, the intellectualistic desire for distinct, analyzed and systematized communicable knowledge, are the factors that guide man in the selection and construction of the concepts with which he builds respectively common sense, scientific laws and theories, philosophical systems. Under the influence of these practical needs and aspirations we select, among the data of experience, the elements that satisfy them, and we neglect the others. We shape and express these elements into those notions and principles which, in our handling of reality, give the best results and satisfaction for our practical needs of action, clearness and systematization. So our concepts and judgments are primarily useful and efficacious, rather than true; they are means of action rather than representations of reality. Hence their character as distinct, clear-cut, static notions, so different from the continuous dynamism of real experience.

We meet with the same notion of concept in the American and English schools of Pragmatism. For Professor James, our concepts are not representations of reality; they are *substitutes for* sense experiences; they are "tools" fashioned by the human mind for the manipulation of experience. "Our notions of time, space, matter and mind, etc. . . ." he says, "are definite conquests made by our ancestors, at historic date, in their attempt to get the chaos of their crude individual experiences in a more shareable and manageable shape. . . .

They proved of such sovereign use as "*Denkmittel*" that they are now a part of the very structure of our mind. No experience can upset them. By them we may the better see the course of our experience, communicate with one another and steer our lives by rule; we may also have a clearer and more inclusive view. . . . They are an accumulation of our own intellectual inventions in our struggle for truth" . . . .[12] "Without abstract concepts to handle our perceptual particulars by, we are like men hopping on one foot."[13]

In almost the same words, Dr. Schiller tells us that concepts are "tools slowly fashioned by the practical intelligence for the mastery of experience,"[14] that "Reason is not a faculty, but a group of habits which men have acquired and which we may find extremely useful, nay necessary, for the successful carrying on of life. . . . Thinking and judging is a highly artificial manipulation of experience; . . . . it uses concepts and axioms which reveal themselves as postulates to a voluntaristic theory of knowledge which tries to understand them. . . . The fallacy of a priori dogmatism does not lie in its deductive procedure, but in its tacit assumption that the conceptions it argues from are final and not to be revised."[15]

Professor Dewey defines "idea," that is concept and judgment, as a "plan of action" devised under the influence of a "doubt-inquiry-answer experience." Its function is not to represent reality, but to serve to direct observation, to colligate data and guide experimentation. Its value consists in its effective working, in its fulfillment of the plan.[16]

Thus concepts and judgments are primarily instruments of action. Have they not, then, any value as knowledge? We may say, Pragmatists answer, that they have a certain value as knowledge, not in the sense that they contain or represent reality, but in the sense that they indicate a direction to follow,

[12] *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 62, 63, 65.
[13] *Id.*, p. 246; see also pp. 110-113; *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 217-19.
[14] *Studies in Humanism*, p. 64.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 356.
[16] *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, v.

suggest a certain attitude to take, a "dynamic scheme" to fill in order to reach experimental reality. The successive perfections of our concepts, the French pragmatists say, the successive changes in the scientific theories and philosophical systems furnish us with a starting point and a directive suggestion in our attempt to reach reality. In themselves, however, they are merely "a common or average image accompanied by a name." [17] Professor James tells us that they are words, symbols, images; "what the intellect knows clearly is only the word and its steering function." [18]

Pragmatism is plainly then, in its view of concept and conceptual knowledge, a return to nominalism.

The Empiricism of Pragmatism.

Pragmatism could not stand merely as a method by which we discern error from truth, and as a criticism of the intellectualistic theory of concept and judgment. As a method it had to prove its legitimacy; as a criticism of intellectual knowledge, it had to ascertain the principles and ground of its attack; even as a theory of truth it had to clear up the problem of reality and of our relations with it. So it was ultimately led to elaborate a theory on the nature of reality and on our way of knowing or experiencing it. If my concept of "man" is merely a substitute for my various sense-experiences about men, the questions naturally arise: what kind of a reality is man? in what way and how far do my sense experiences reveal that reality? Pragmatism had logically to accept or build a system of metaphysics.

Dr. Schiller may say that metaphysics is "really luxuries"; [19] that "neither Pragmatism nor Humanism necessitates a metaphysics"; [20] yet he comes to confess that it "may, some-

[17] Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 327.

[18] *Pragmatism*, p. 185; see also *The Meaning of Truth*, *passim*, especially pp. 20-29.

[19] *Studies in Humanism*, p. 11, 17.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

what definitely, point to one" and that it "implies ultimately a voluntaristic metaphysic."[21] And, although his thought is not yet clear on this point, we may, however, divine his metaphysical principles in his very definition of Humanism[22] and in such articles as the one on "The Making of Reality."[23]

Leaving aside, for the moment, the problem on the nature of reality, we shall consider here only the problem of knowledge.

Professor James' Radical Empiricism.

On this problem of knowledge, Professor James has been more definite and he has given us the fundamental principles of his theory which he calls "Radical Empiricism."

Let us quote the typical example used by him to illustrate his theory. "Suppose me to be sitting here in my library in Cambridge, at ten minutes walk from "Memorial Hall," and to be thinking truly of the latter object. My mind may have before it only the name, or it may have a clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such intrinsic differences in the image make no difference in its cognitive function. Certain *extrinsic* phenomena, special experiences of conjunction, are what impart to the image its knowing office. . . . If I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its history and present uses; if in its presence I now feel my idea to be *continued;* if the associates of the image and the felt hall run parallel, so that each term of the one context corresponds serially, as I walk, with an answering term of the other; why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality. That percept was what it *meant,* for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention. Nowhere is then far, but every later moment matches and corroborates an earlier. In this matching and corroborating, taken *in no transcendental sense,* but denoting *definitely felt transitions,*[24] lies all that the knowing

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 11. [22] *Ibid.*, p. 5. [23] *Ibid.*
[24] Italics mine.

of a precept by an idea can possibly contain or signify. Wherever such transitions are felt, the first experience *knows* the last one. Knowledge thus lives inside the tissue of experience. It is *made;* and made by relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain intermediaries are given, of such a kind that, as they develop toward their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known. That is all that knowing (in the simple case considered) can be known as, that is the whole of its nature put into experiential terms. Whenever such is the sequence of our experiences, we may freely say that we had the terminal object "in mind" from the outset, although *at* the outset nothing was then *in us but a flat piece of substantive experience like any other,*[25] with no self-transcendency about it, and no mystery save the mystery of coming into existence and of being followed by other pieces of substantive experience, with conjunctively transitional experiences between." [26]

Thus knowledge does not consist in an agreement between an experience and its object, it consists of continued experiences. It is "made by the ambulation through the intervening experiences"; [27] it is "ambulatory" not "saltatory"; it implies continuity not transcendence. The meaning of an idea or image does not imply a leap—the "salto mortale"—to its object; it is a process of leading from one experience to another. The process is perceptual or "knowledge of," if "the knower and the known are the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different contexts"; it is conceptual or "knowledge about," if the knower and the known are "two pieces of *actual* experience belonging to the same subject with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between them"; "or the known is a *possible* experience, either of that

[25] Italics mine.

[26] "A World of Pure Experience," *Journ. of Phil., Psy. and Sc. Methods,* Vol. I, pp. 539, 540.

[27] "A Word more about Truth," *ibid.,* Vol. IV, p. 399.

subject or of another, to which the said conjunctive transitions *would* lead, if sufficiently prolonged." [28]

Thus knowledge consists of a continuity of pure experiences in which "things and their relations of conjunction and disjunction 'is,' 'isn't,' 'then,' 'before,' 'in,' 'on,' 'beside,' 'between,' 'next,' etc. . . flower out of the stream of experience" and are immediately felt.[29]

Professor Dewey's Immediate Empiricism.

Professor Dewey's theory of knowledge is very much like Professor James'. Knowledge, for him, is "a doubt-inquiry-answer experience." At first we have a "mere experience" which is in no way knowledge. This experience is found to be inconsistent and unsatisfactory; it puts our mind in an attitude of "doubt," with the consciousness of a needed reorganization. To the attitude of "doubt" then succeeds the process of "inquiry." An "idea" or a "plan of action" suggests itself for the reorganization of experience and is tried. The plan is found to work satisfactorily and, for the first time, we have a "cognitive thing" although not yet a "cognitional thing." Here is one of the examples used by Professor Dewey to illustrate his theory. I smell a sweet odor. My experience is then "just a floating odor, nothing more." I ask myself what is *meant* by this odor. A certain "plan of action" then suggests itself, as to the meaning of that odor—perhaps the odor of a rose—, and directs me through a series of various musculatory actions of my divers senses such as walking, handling, looking, etc. . . . I come there to smell and enjoy a rose. There is yet no knowledge. But if the original smell has persisted in my consciousness until the moment of gratification, then the smell is represented "with a quality, an office, that of having excited activity and thereby having terminated its career in a certain *quale* of gratification." I have a "*cognitive thing*," for the smell "is experienced as *meaning* gratification

[28] "A World of Pure Experience," *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 538.

[29] "The Thing and its relations," *ibid.*, Vol. II, reprinted in *A Pluralistic Universe*, App. A.

. . . . in a fashion which operates to effect what is meant" and I "retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the smell" and this is what is signified by "cognitive." "Yet the smell is not *cognitional,* because it did not knowingly intend to mean this, but is found after the event to have meant it." But let the smell be present again, not as original nor as smell with gratification, but as smell "fated or charged with the sense of the possibility of fulfillment," then experience is "cognitional," for it is "contemporaneously aware that it means something beyond itself." To sum up: "The odor knows the rose; the rose is known by the odor; and the import of each term is constituted by the relationship in which it stands to the other." Hence the somewhat complex definition of the simplest form of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of the acquaintance-type, as presented by Professor Dewey: "An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced destination and connection of the two elements in the following sort: *one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through an operation it sets up.*" [30]

Professor Bergson's Intuitionism.

For Professor Bergson, as we have seen, conceptual knowledge is not a knowledge of, but an interpretation about, reality, suggested and directed by our practical needs. It deals only with surfaces; it gives things *made* while reality is *in the making;* concepts are distinct, static and separate, while reality is continuous dynamism. How can we then know reality as it is or rather as it becomes? There is only one way, Professor Bergson answers; it is *to live it;* there is only one method; that of "*intuition.*" Let us take our common sense notions, our

[30] "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind,* N. S., 59, July, 1906, pp. 293 ff.; cf. also "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," *Journ. of Phil.,* Vol. II, pp. 397 ff.

scientific and philosophical concepts and theories, not as results, but as a starting point. Under their direction let us adapt ourselves to the fluent reality, penetrate inside of it and by a kind of deep sympathy become that reality itself. For our conception of time and motion as successive moments or distinct spatial points added to each other let us substitute an action, by which we move in the continuous duration, flowing and advancing forward in and with it through all its various currents; in this way and in this way only "can reality be reached in a definitive embrace." [31]

As we may easily see, Metaphysical Pragmatism is a return to Empiricism; to "Radical Empiricism" according to Professor James, to "Immediate Empiricism" according to Professor Dewey, to "Integral Empiricism" according to Professor Bergson.[32] Professor James could with reason dedicate his book on "Pragmatism" to J. Stuart Mill's memory; the English positivist would have acknowledged the American pragmatist as his faithful disciple.

What is to be thought of these theories? Is there no way between the a priori Absolutism of artificial concepts and pure experience or empirical intuition? Are we bound to accept James' ultimatum: "Bradley or Bergson"? [33] There is, we are sure, a middle way and we are not coerced into the fatal ultimatum. It is the way traced and pursued by the traditional Philosophy of Aristotle, St. Thomas and the Schoolmen, the way of Moderate Realism, a way in which both intuition and concept, experience and reasoning have their necessary and legitimate places, functions and values.

This is the doctrine that we shall now state and defend.

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[31] *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 371; Compare with Pierce's "Synechism" in *Monist*. 1890-1893 and in Baldwin's *Dict. of Phil. and Psych.*, s. v.

[32] "Introduction à la Métaphysique," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Janvier, 1903.

[33] *Journ. of Phil. Psychol. and Sc. Methods*, Jan. 20, 1910.

ARISTOTLE AS A LOGICIAN AND A SCIENTIST.

When it is said that Aristotle was the founder of logic, the meaning is not that he it was who first taught men how to reason. For, although logic is the science and art of reasoning, there were men and women who, for untold generations, reasoned, and reasoned correctly, about many things, before he came to tell them how to do it. Just as human beings, for countless ages, used water for drinking purposes, before the chemist appeared, and told them that water is composed of two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen. The chemist subjected water to analysis and thus learned how it is composed. By another kind of analysis, an analysis that is mental, Aristotle resolved the complex process of reasoning into the simpler processes which compose it, and thus was able to draw up a set of rules for right thinking, which were henceforth to form the body of logical doctrine. By logic we learn to do reflectively what we should otherwise do instinctively. And, reasoning, especially reasoning on subjects with which we are not familiar, being a difficult process when compared with walking, or eating, which we do by instinct also, a set of rules for the right conduct of reasoning is, as we know by experience, not only useful but necessary. Sancho Panza invoked blessings on the man who invented sleep; we may or may not be inclined to bless the memory of him who invented logic. But, whether we are or are not as grateful as we ought to be, we must acknowledge that the man who invented logic was Aristotle.

Before his time, the art of subtle and contentious argumentation had been brought to a high degree of perfection by Zeno of Elea. It was Zeno who undertook to prove that there is no such a thing as motion or change, that everything is in a state of rest, and that our impression of change or motion is an illusion. Thus, he argued that since that which is always in one place is at rest; and the arrow in its flight is always in one place (it is now at one place, it is now at another, but

always in *one* place); therefore the moving arrow is at rest. He proposed also the problem of Achilles and the tortoise, and tried to show that, once you give the tortoise, who is the slowest of animals, a start, let us say, of ten yards, Achilles, though he is the swiftest of runners, will never catch up with him. This was not logic. It was argumentation of a specious sort. After Zeno came the sophists, who went to all kinds of excesses in their abuse of the art of reasoning. The sophists, to amuse and bewilder their Athenian audience, gravely maintained that, since three and two are five, and three is odd and two is even, therefore five is both odd and even. With a cheap kind of humor combined with unlimited audacity, they entertained their listeners somewhat after the manner of the professional juggler or the slight-of-hand man. "If a discussion is uncomfortable for the sophist he evades it; if an answer is desired of him, he insists on asking questions; if anyone tries to escape from ambiguous questions by closer definition, he demands yes or no; if he thinks his adversary knows an answer, he begins by deprecating all that can possibly be said on that side; if he is accused of contradicting himself, he protests against 'raking up old scores'; if he has no other resource, he stupifies his adversary with speeches, the absurdity of which precludes any reply. He tries to hoodwink the diffident man by a swaggering mode of address, to surprise the thoughtful man by hasty inferences, to betray the inexperienced man into surprising statements and clumsy expressions."[1] One of the favorite sophisms was to prove that no one can learn anything: Because, everyone is either wise or foolish: If he is wise, he cannot learn, because he already knows, and, if he is foolish, he cannot learn, because he is incapable of understanding. We are inclined to think that these devices of the sophists were silly. And so they were. But the Athenian audience did not think so. They had no logic to aid them in pointing out the fallacies that lie so plainly on the surface in these arguments, and their attitude of mind was such that the cheap tricks of the

[1] Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II, 463 f.

sophist, instead of disgusting, delighted them. We know for a fact that the success of the sophists was immediate and universal, until Socrates appeared on the scene. He saw at once whither matters were drifting. He saw that all seriousness of purpose was being sacrificed in the desire to amuse and be amused. He foretold impending disaster, both moral and intellectual, unless a remedy were found for the evil which the sophists had wrought. He proposed that remedy in the method now known as the Socratic Method, which was designed to develop in the mind of the learner a concept of the subject studied. In other words, he urged that the person who begins to think systematically about any subject first obtain a definition of the subject, and he promised that, once a person attained to the definition, one could defy the subtlety of the sophist. Plato, like the intellectual aristocrat that he was, spurned the whole subject of sophistry; he disdained to mingle with the sophists in the marketplace or the theatre or the banquet-hall. Fixing his attention on spiritual truth in the world above us, he clung to the vision of celestial prototypes, and "far from the madding crowd," found rest and peace and inspiration for conduct, in a world where the art of the quibbler and the mental juggler is replaced by the noblest art of them all, divine philosophy. Philosophy, he says, consists in a contemplation of Ideas. This art, he adds, is the "noblest music." It charms the soul, and like Orpheus' strains, has power to lure us from the nether world to the higher spiritual realm.

There can be no doubt that Aristotle, when he composed his treatises on logic, was actuated by the same motive which had moved in different ways Socrates and Plato. Indeed, one of his treatises, *On Sophistical Arguments,* is a direct refutation of the arguments of the sophists and a condemnation of their methods. But, while his purpose was the same as that of Socrates and Plato, his manner of proceeding was quite different. Let us suppose that all three of them are interested in ameteur gardening. Let us imagine that there is a particular kind of flower which they wish to cultivate. Socrates would call attention to the rank weeds that the sophists were sowing

in the garden, and not only sowing but tending with elaborate care, to the detriment, naturally, of the rosebush struggling for existence among them. Root out the weeds, he would advise, dig up the soil, see that its natural nutritive qualities be brought to bear on the rose tree, and on that alone. Plato would approve the method advocated by his master. He would then go on to tell you of the ideal flower; he would wax eloquent on its beauty, the delicacy of its coloring, the softness of its texture, the perfect symmetry of its shape, the exquisiteness of its perfume. He would hold up to the mind of the gardener the perfect prototype of what he was striving to produce, and perhaps—for this is the inherent weakness of Platonism—the gardener, lost in the contemplation of the ideal, would end by neglecting the real task before him. Aristotle, too, would approve the Socratic method: root up the weeds, he would say, and, if you are so inclined, learn from Plato what the ideal rose is; but, above all things, study the nature of the plant you are tending, learn its constitution, habits and needs, study the soil around it, find out which elements are wanting. Be a practical botanist, but first be an analytical naturalist. Take the rosebush, or a portion of it, and find out how it is organized, observe how similar plants thrive or fail in other kinds of soil, and bring all this to bear on the particular problem of rose culture that is before you.

This is the spirit in which Aristotle undertook the foundation of the science and art of logic as a remedy against the errors to which the human mind is subject. For, observe, that by his method of proceeding you arrive at general principles which are valid not only against this sophist or that sophist, but against all sophists whatsoever. He took the human mind, so to speak, into his laboratory; he broke it up into the different powers, the power of reasoning, the power of judging, the power of forming ideas and precepts. He studied these under the microscope of analysis, mental analysis, of course. Then he went out and studied the environment. He studied the sources of truth and error, the garden in which the mind grows. He studied language and customs and institutions. He showed

how some errors are due to our use of words, how others are due to our habits of thought, how others are due to our unreflecting opinion, and others still to our emotions, our affections, our prejudices and our peculiarities of disposition. He became, in a word, the naturalist of the mind in order afterwards to become the legislator of the mind. All the laws of thought which he formulated to guide us in right thinking were founded on an inquiry into the nature and constitution of the mind by which we think.

There is another point of contact also between Aristotle and the sophists. The sophists cultivated the art of argumentation without reference to truth and error. In fact, they proclaimed their belief that there is no absolute standard by which we can tell what is true and what is false. Their professed purpose was to prepare young men for public life. At Athens in those days, as in every democracy since then, the ability to make a telling speech, and the power to argue a case before a popular assembly were recognized as an asset indispensable to a man with political ambitions. It did not matter whether the plea was in itself plausible or not. It did not matter at all whether one was on the right side or on the wrong side. Indeed the boast of the sophists was that they could teach a young man to make the better cause appear the worse, and the worse cause the better. To lead a forlorn hope is the height of military heroism: to take up a despised, and apparently a lost, cause and by plausible arguments make it appear to be the noblest and most estimable, was the ideal of the youthful Athenian sophist. Aristotle, like Socrates, was sensible of the demoralization to which this led. He was convinced that there is a standard of true and false, as well as of right and wrong. He reached this conviction from his study of the human mind. At the same time it was a fundamental principle with him that man is ordained for the society of his fellowmen. He proceeded, therefore, to draw up the rules of logic in such a way that they would aid, not only the meditative recluse in his cell, or the lonely student in his laboratory, but also the man of business in the market-place, the orator in the forum, the

politician in the popular assembly and the man of the world in polite intercourse with his fellowmen. His logic is never out of touch with rhetoric. He tells how to reason, and he tells us also how to apply our reason. He tells us how to frame an argument, and he tells us also how to arrange our arguments in conversation or in public discourse so as to have the most desirable effect. He teaches us how to reach the truth and how, by exposition and demonstration, to teach the truth to others. His logic is not only scientific, because based on an analysis of the mind and its environment, but also humanitarian, or social, in the large sense of the word, because it takes into account the requiremnts of mental life in the aggregate.

I do not intend in this paper to attempt an exposition of the contents of Aristotle's logic. Some of my readers are no doubt familiar with those contents. For, of all the portions of his philosophy this is the one that has undergone the least change. Everyone who has studied logic, no matter in what school or under what auspices one may have studied it, has studied it as Aristotle taught it. One may have studied some things in logic, such as Induction, Hypothesis, the rules of Observation and Experiment, the laws of investigation of social phenomena, which, in whole or in part, are new. But, in the study of terms and their arrangement, in the study of propositions and their conversion and opposition, and in the study of the structure of arguments, the analysis of arguments and the rules for the detection of fallacies, whether one's teacher was an Aristotelian or a disciple of some later master, one is certain to have followed, not only in the broad outlines, but in many of the details, the rules laid down by Aristotle in his *Categories,* his *Perihermenias,* his two *Analytics,* and his work *On Sophistical Arguments.*

One may, however, with perfect reasonableness, desire to know what Aristotle aimed at in his treatises on logic. His purpose, as was said before, was wider than that of Socrates. He did not merely wish to counteract the influence of the sophists. He laid the foundations of his logic on general psychological prin-

ciples, which are valid universally and for all time. He may have erred in details, for he was only a human being, and not infallible; and no one would be so absurd as to maintain that his work in logic was in any sense final or irreformable. What is meant is that in intention, he legislated, within the region of rational thought, not merely for his day and generation, but for the human mind in general, in every age and in every clime. What then, was his standard of perfection? If someone were to undertake to teach you how to row a boat, you would naturally think, "What is his idea of a successful oarsman?" or you might perhaps, ask him, "When shall you be satisfied that I have attained your ideal (relatively speaking), of an oarsman?" Aristotle undertakes to teach you how to think. You may, therefore, ask him: "When is a man said to think well, or successfully?" Aristotle answers by dividing our thought processes into three kinds. There is, first of all, or, at least, highest of all, the process of reasoning. This is a prerogative of human beings. The lower animals, whatever degree of so-called intelligence they may attain, do not reason. This, at least, is Aristotle's view. Reasoning consists in passing from truths already known to a new truth, or rather to a truth that is new to the reasoner, but contained in the truth already known to him. Let us suppose that there is someone who does not know that the substance formerly called "spirit of salt" is a poison. He has learned in chemistry, or he takes the authority of a medical dictionary for the statement: "All mineral acids are poisons." Now, by experimental analysis, or perhaps again, by consulting some authority on the subject, he learns that "Spirit of salt is a mineral acid." He is now in possession of two truths: "All mineral acids are poisons; spirit of salt is a mineral acid." When he infers, as he cannot help doing, "Therefore, spirit of salt is a poison," the process by which he passes to the hitherto unknown truth is a process of reasoning. But even this comparatively simple (in the sense of being an easy) process is complex. There are three judgments involved in it, first that "All mineral acids are poisons," next, that "Spirit of salt is a mineral acid," and lastly, that

"Spirit of salt is a poison." If, now, we subject a judgment to analysis, we find that in each expressed judgment there are two terms, and that each term is a word or group of words standing for a very simple content of the mind, namely, an idea, or precept, or mental representation of some kind. The result of our analysis is that the reasoning process is made up of judgments and that in judgments there are present some kind of mental representations. Beginning with the last, the processes of thinking are enumerated as 1) The formation of mental representations, 2) Judgment, and 3) Reasoning. Aristotle's purpose in logic is to show how, by practice in the rules which he lays down, we may attain to relative perfection in each of these. The logical mind is the mind which reasons *well,* which judges *well,* which forms its mental representations *well.* But *well* in each case has a different meaning. We reason well when our reasoning is sound, or valid, when it has no flaw or weakness—the word "sound," or "valid" is a figurative one, and really means "healthy." We judge well when our judgments are consistent with one another and true. And we form mental images well when those images are true and clear and there is order among them. The logical mind, then, as Aristotle understands it, is the mind which reasons validly, judges consistently, has clear and orderly ideas, and, over all and through it all, conforms to the standard of truth. To go deeper into the question of truth would take us out of logic into metaphysics. Enough has, I think, been said to show that Aristotle's notion of logic is practical in the best human sense.

To trace in detail the history of Aristotelian logic would be to venture into minute questions of interpretation, elucidation, and technical exposition. Some portions of logic were improved by the Stoics, other parts were developed and explained in the course of subsequent centuries by a whole line of commentators, Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic and Hebrew, before we come to medieval times, and there, again, whatever additions were made were either elucidations of the text, or merely pedagogical improvements, that is to say, improvements in the technical methods of teaching logic. The same is true, com-

paratively speaking, of modern times. During all the centuries from Aristotle's day to our own, the history of Aristotelian logic is the story of minute additions, or improvements of a secondary nature. In essentials, the logic of Aristotle remained unchanged, and in practically its original form continued to be the only logic studied. Here we have a fact unique, I think, in human history—one single work remaining the standard work on an important subject for more than two thousand years. For, in every school of philosophy, whether Platonist, or Stoic, or Epicurean, or Neo-Platonic, or Medieval Christian, or Modern, no matter what estimate was placed on Aristotle's philosophy in general, his logic was held to be the norm and standard, with only an occasional voice raised in protest, and that not so much against the logic as a whole, as against some particular point. During all that time, in all the succession and variety of philosophical creeds, the Western World, and the portion of the Asiatic World that was most active, intellectually, sat at the feet of Aristotle and learned from him how to think. In all matters, save that of religion (as distinguished from theology), in all matters, one might say, where the training of the intellect counts as the important element or factor in education, Aristotle held a position of preëminence with hardly one serious rival. Curiously enough, he himself seemed to claim the distinction beforehand. For, while he was willing to grant that in the theory of government, in ethics and in rhetoric he had predecessors to whom he gave due credit, he reserved for himself the honor of having founded logic.[2] This honor posterity has willingly conceded him. His teaching was later to be made the matter of dispute, and even of violent recrimination. It was to be made the subject of legislation both ecclesiastical and civil; witness the decree of Francis I in 1543 forbidding the dissemination of the logic of Peter Ramus. There were to be those who, opposing logic in general, were hostile to the logic of Aristotle. But, wherever the science was taught, it was taught according to his

[2] Cf. concluding sentence of the *Organon*.

method and his doctrine. Even after the Reformation, and in countries where the Reform controlled the educational policy, the influence of Aristotle as a logician was undiminished. It was no medieval monk, but an English divine, a member of the University of Oxford in the sixteenth century, who declared that he would rather lose his own life than depart from the teaching of Aristotle; *prius vitam quam Aristotelem deseram.*[3] The sentiment was publicly proclaimed, and met with unanimous applause at the great English institution of learning. And this was the spirit, not only of Oxford, but also of the other English universities. There logic was taught from Aristotle's text, and seldom went beyond the limits of Aristotle's teaching. The same is true of France, where, even after the Revolution, the dominant influence of the Sorbonne was always on the side of Aristotle in logic. In vain did Bacon in England and Descartes in France try to set up a rival system. The learned world welcomed their physics and their mathematics and their psychology, but in logic it still remained faithful to Aristotle. About the middle of the nineteenth century appeared John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic,* a work which, whatever its intrinsic defects, has had a very decisive influence so far as the teaching of logic and the influence of Aristotle are concerned. Mill's philosophy is now generally admitted to have been inherently self-contradictory. His superficial sensism and his latent skepticism no longer satisfy our age which, with all its faults, is seriously searching for a foundation for the higher spiritual truths. But, in spite of these defects, the *System of Logic* has worked a real, and, we may say, a needed reform. Logic continues to be taught along Aristotelian lines, as far as Aristotle's logic went. But, in the everwidening field of scientific research and the study of social phenomena the new logic has come to be recognized as a needed extension and amplification of the old. For it is not a complete innovation. Did time permit us to enter into the question, we could, I have no doubt, be led to the convic-

[3] *Logicæ Libri Quinque,* Auctore R. Crackenthorpo, Oxon. 2 ed. 1641.

tion that, fundamentally and in principle, the logic of scientific research is far more Aristotelian than Mill's admirers seem willing to admit. That Aristotle, the naturalist and the founder of so many of the sciences should teach a system of logic incompatible with scientific research is antecedently improbable, to say the least. His whole philosophy rests on the investigation of facts, his method throughout is the scientific method, and the logic of the sciences, so far from being subversive of Aristotle's logic, is nothing but a natural development of his general principles, a development which, like all others, waited until the times were historically ripe.

We come now to Aristotle as a scientist. And, here there is no end of tributes willingly and loyally paid to him by those in ancient and modern times whose distinction in the natural sciences entitles them to attention and consideration. Those who have visited Mount Vernon, near Washington, have seen, no doubt, some of the floral wreaths which imperial and royal visitors from abroad have placed on the tomb of George Washington. It seems, indeed, to be custom which international courtesy imposes. Similarly, though, of course, in the figurative sense merely, scientific courtesy seems to demand that every great man of science lay his tribute of praise at the feet of the first great scientist, Aristotle. Take the distinguished men in one line alone, that of physiology and biology. Beginning with the physician Galen in the second century and coming down to the physiologists and biologists of our own day, there are the Arabian physicians, the Christian schoolmen, especially Albert the Great, and in modern times, Harvey, Descartes, Linné, Buffon, Cuvier, Agassiz, Claude Bernard, Milne-Edwards, Huxley, Brooks—and hundreds of others, less well known who, though they upset on many points the Aristotelian tradition, and changed our view on the world of vital phenomena as completely as Copernicus changed our outlook on the astronomical world, give most enthusiastic tribute to the greatness of Aristotle's genius and the truly scientific character of his work. In fact, their enthusiasm for the fame of Aristotle seems to be second only to their interest in nature itself. The

same is true of the physicists. How far their work owed its success to what Aristotle achieved in his day is a question that no man can solve satisfactorily or with any show of justice to them and to him. We are more concerned now with learning what Aristotle did to merit the praise of those, of whom it may be said in the best sense of the phrase that "praise from them is praise indeed."

In the first place, Aristotle, although he had predecessors, as is evident from his own writings, was the first to gather together into one great system the facts relating to vital phenomena. The title commonly given him is that of Father of the Biological Sciences. His works *On the Histories of Animals, On the Parts of Animals, On the Generation of Animals,* are the foundation of Systematic Classification, General Biology, Morphology (or Anatomy) and Morphogeny, (or Embryology). And this represents only a portion of what he achieved. His contributions to Physics, to Astronomy, to Physical Geography and to Meteorology are equally remarkable. How one man could, within the short span of a single lifetime, gather together the immense mass of ascertained facts which his works on nature contain, is nothing short of marvelous. He enumerates, for instance, five hundred different kinds of animals, among them one hundred and fifteen species or varieties of fishes. Well might Athenaeus exclaim; "Aristotle is a marvel to me. I should like to know from what Proteus or Nereus of the deep sea he learned what fishes do, how they sleep, how they live." We know that his information is due, in part to the generous assistance of Alexander, his pupil, and most of all to his own insatiable desire for knowledge and his indefatigable industry. And not only is his information wonderfully wide, but it is still more wonderfully accurate. Indeed, some of his assertions, about deep sea fishes especially, which were formerly set down to misinformation or malobservation, have been found in recent times to be absolutely true. For example, he says that many sharks not only bring forth their young alive, but nourish them before birth by a process resembling that of mammals. This was rediscovered by Johann

Müller in the nineteenth century. And his method is as much to be admired as the results which he attained. His desire for knowledge, that noble curiosity, of which he speaks in the opening sentence of his *Metaphysics* was insatiable. He was interested in everything. And he spared no pains to ascertain the facts in every case with the utmost accuracy. Having accumulated his data, he arranged them, compared them, sifted them, and drew his conclusion without prejudice or favor, so far as rival hypotheses were concerned. In a word, his method was truly scientific. We must remember, too, how he was handicapped compared with the modern scientist. He had none of the ingenious and accurate devices by which the investigator in our day is aided in his research. He had neither telescope nor microscope; he was obliged to ascertain differences of temperature without the aid of a thermometer, and to mark the differences of time without any timepiece other than the hour-glass. He had no finely swung chemical balance *in vacuo,* to tell minute differences of weight; no airpump to produce a vacuum; no blast pipe or electric furnace to produce high temperatures; no artificial freezer to produce the required degree of coldness; none of the delicate psychophysiological instruments of the modern laboratory, to aid him in his study of psychic phenomena. Moreover, he was handicapped in other ways too; he shared the universal classic horror of corpses; it is evident that he never dissected a human body, and it is more than probable that he never dissected the bodies even of the lower animals; all his wonderfully accurate observations on that subject were made either at the place of sacrifice or in the butcher's shambles, where the entrails of animals could be viewed. It is no wonder that he made mistakes. The wonder is that he did not make more. He believed, for instance, in spontaneous generation, thinking, as many since his time have thought, that the lower forms of life, worms for example, and insects, are bred not from eggs, but spontaneously from decaying meat or other animal matter. This question, as is well known, was not finally settled in the negative until our own day, when Louis Pasteur, by a series of brilliant experi-

ments, showed conclusively that in the present condition of nature all life comes from life. Aristotle had no knowledge of the function of nerves; those silverlike threads which he observed in the flesh of animals he believed to be fine strings used to tense and relax the muscles. It was his disciple Galen in the second century of our era who first got an inkling of the important function which those little filaments perform in carrying sensory impulses. Sometimes, it was the very honesty, so to speak, of the man that betrayed him. He says, for instance, that the cranium of the dog is solid, that it has no sutures, as the serrated lines between the bones of the skull are called. That, of course, is not true. But Aristotle probably examined the skull of an old dog, the process of ossification having in that instance almost obliterated the sutures. He told us what he saw, and drew the conclusion he believed to be warranted by the fact. His conclusion is false, but his method is that of the true scientist. Sometimes, he is misinformed. For example, he says; "Children resemble their parents not only in congenital characters, but also in those acquired later in life. For cases are known where parents have been marked by scars and the children have shown traces of these scars in the same places; a case is reported from Chalcedon in which a father had been branded with a letter, and the same letter, somewhat blurred and not sharply defined, appeared on the arm of his child." [4] Most scientists nowadays would declare that the fact here narrated did not occur, because it cannot occur. Aristotle may have been deceived as to the fact, but he gives it, as narrated, and draws the conclusion which it seems to warrant. A modern biologist would be more cautious than Aristotle. Caution, however, comes with long experience, and it is well perhaps, for us that, though lack of caution betrayed Aristotle into more than one mistake, he did not carry caution to the point of skepticism, as some modern investigators do.

With the influence of Aristotle's scientific doctrines I should like to deal at length, did time permit. It has often been said that the authority of Aristotle delayed for whole centuries

[4] *De Gen. Anim.* I, 35.

the dawn of the modern era of scientific discoveries. That is an assertion which it would be difficult to prove. I believe that the era of discovery dawned as soon as the discoverer appeared. The discoverer was obliged in many instances, to combat the authority of Aristotle; had he appeared earlier he would have had the same difficulty to meet, and he would have overcome it then, as he did later, by the power of personal genius and the courage which comes with a vision of the truth. In the meantime the scientific doctrines of Aristotle filled up the immense gap in history between him and those who, like Galileo and Copernicus, inaugurated the modern era. And those doctrines had more direct influence on the discoverers than we are commonly aware of. It is a commonplace in history to say that the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the age of scientific discovery, broke completely with the preceding age, which was dominated by Aristotle. Let me try to show that one important discovery, at least, was influenced directly and, so far as purely scientific antecedents went, exclusively, I think, by the teaching of Aristotle. I allude to the work of the fifteenth century navigators in general and to the discoveries of Columbus in particular.

It can, I believe, be shown that certain texts in Aristotle's works on Physical Geography had a determining influence on the resolution of Columbus to venture westward from Spain in search of a new route to the Indies. The Aristotelian passage referred to occurs at the end of the treatise *De Coelo* (*On the Heavens*). "Those who think," says Aristotle, "that the region beyond the Pillars of Hercules (Straits of Gibraltar) is contiguous with India and that the shores of both are washed by the same sea do not seem to me to put forward an opinion that taxes our credulity too much." [5] Again, in the work *On Meteorology*, "The lands beyond the Indies and the Columns of Hercules do not appear to be united, because the sea intervenes, so that the whole inhabited earth is not continuous." [6] The second passage is somewhat obscure; but the first very clearly

[5] *De Coelo*, II, 14, 298 ff.
[6] *Meteor.*, II, 5, 362b, 27 ff.

indicates Aristotle's belief that the route to India lies westward across the Atlantic from the Straits of Gibraltar. That, at least, was the interpretation put upon it by those who took any notice of the text between the time it was written by Aristotle and the time when Columbus was planning his voyage of discovery. First, the Greek interpreters, Themistius especially and Simplicius, called attention to the passage, and commented on it, drawing the conclusion that the distance across the Atlantic cannot be very great, or at least that there is but one sea, however vast, between the Pillars of Hercules and the shores of India. Later, the Arabs took the same meaning out of the text; for instance the geographer Massoudi and the philosopher Averroes. Finally, come the great medieval interpreters, St. Thomas, Albert the Great and Roger Bacon, all of whom, on the authority of Aristotle, assert that the distance by sea between Spain and the Indies is not very great. And, what adds greatest force to our argument is the circumstance that some of their contemporaries, like John of Holywood, and Robert of Lincoln, who did not rely on Aristotle, hold the contrary opinion. But, you will say, from St. Thomas to Christopher Columbus there is an interval of more than two centuries. It can be shown, however, that the tradition was unbroken. A treatise on the sphere written in French by Nicolas Oresme towards the end of the fourteenth century, and a work, of the same period, by Cardinal Peter d'Ailly, called the *Image of the World,* reiterate the same opinion and quote the Aristotelian texts. It was through the last named work by the great French Cardinal, surnamed "The Eagle of France" that Columbus became acquainted with Aristotle's texts on the subject. In his "Relations of his Four Voyages," written probably in 1498, we find these words "Aristotle says that the world is small, that the amount of water (compared with land) is small, and that one may pass easily from Spain to the Indies. Auenruyz (Averroes) confirms this idea and Cardinal Peter de Aliaco cites it—saying that Aristotle was able to know many of the secrets of the world owing to (the generosity of) Alexander the Great." It

would, of course, be absurd to say that Columbus was inspired in his great enterprise by this text of Aristotle and by this text alone. There were other and more practical considerations; his own experience, and the experience of other mariners, the advice of Toscanelli and so forth. But among the determinants, as he himself tells us, was this passage of the Aristotelian text, and perhaps that, more than any other argument, had weight with the councillors of Isabella who approved his project.

This is merely an example of a condition which, I believe, could be proved to exist in many other instances, were the documents available. The discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not come like a bolt from the blue; they did not spring overnight, like mushrooms, out of the soil of modern thought. They were influenced, naturally and necessarily, by the thought of the centuries that went before, and in those centuries the great master in matters scientific was Aristotle.

Leaving now the question of Aristotle's influence, and going back once more to the study of his works on natural science, we may enquire, "What was his general view of natural phenomena, What was his philosophy of nature?" In the first place, Aristotle was a firm believer in the principle of purpose in nature. It was a favorite saying of his that "neither God nor nature does anything in vain"; he believed that "Nature is always striving for the best." He observed everywhere, especially among living things, adaptation of organism to environment and of structure to function. Consequently, among the sources of our knowledge of things he considered Final Causes to be of the greatest importance. Once we know the purpose of a process in nature we are in possession of a key to understanding that process. In the next place, if nature is always striving for the best, what is it that prevents the attainment of the best in all the processes of nature? Aristotle answers by his doctrine of Matter and Form. Matter, he says, is potency or possibility of being; it is indeterminateness, incoherency, the source of limitation and imperfection.

Form is the direct opposite. It is actuality, determinateness, the principle of activity, coherency, and perfection. Formless Matter, having no determinateness, cannot exist by itself. It is found, nevertheless in all finite beings, in composition with form. God, pure actuality, is supreme form without matter, absolutely perfect, and absolutely one. At the other end of the chain of reality is formless matter absolutely imperfect, and the principle of numerical differentiation. God is the zenith, formless matter is the nadir, of reality. Between these two points are spread out all created things, as we call them, composed of matter and form, and ranging higher or lower in the scale of existence according as form or matter predominates. Matter in the amorphous state is nearest to formless matter. Next come the minerals, in which form is a definite, coherent principle. Next come plants, in which the form still further triumphs over matter. Above plants are animals, in which, by the faculty of sensation, the form (in this case, the soul), is far freer from the trammels of matter than in plants. Last of all, or rather, highest of all, is man, whose intellectual life actually transcends and, as it were, defies, all the limitations of matter, such as time and space. Aristotle has no theory of descent according to which man would be descended from animals, animals derived from plants, and plants from minerals. At the same time he binds the whole of nature together by means of his grand, widely reaching, thought, that each lower form is tending to become a higher form, and would reach a higher form by natural process if it were not for the fact that in the lower form the dead weight, so to speak, of matter, holds it down. To the speculative mind, especially to the metaphysical mind trained in the appreciation of comprehensive principles, this is a view of nature that is as satisfying as the theory of genetic evolution.

The eminently scientific character of Aristotle's philosophy of nature cannot be too much emphasized. Neither his method nor his general view of nature is in conflict with modern science. No doubt, some of his doctrines are antiquated, such as his enumeration of the four elements or his explanation of

the phenomena of gravity. Science need not on that account have broken with his philosophy of nature. There is no necessary conflict between that philosophy and the latest achievements of physical science. One may go farther, and say that no other philosophy agrees so well with the scientific explanation as his. Certainly not Idealism. For Idealism tells the scientist that his so called facts are only thoughts, and that his laws of nature are really limitations of his own power of thinking. For example, if matter is only a state of mind, then the law of the indestructibility of matter simply means that I cannot think of matter being destroyed. The conflict of the day is not so much between science and religion as between science and philosophy, because the best accredited philosophy of the day is idealistic. Between the conviction of the scientist that he is dealing with facts and the explanation of the philosopher according to which there are no facts, but only mental states, there is war, war in the din and turmoil of which, common sense never gets a hearing. The Aristotelian philosophy gives no encouragement to the idealist. Like science, it stands for facts and the common sense explanation of facts. The more one realizes this, the more one will be inclined to repeat the wish of a distinguished Scottish scholar of our day, John Stuart Blackie, who, deeply imbued with the spirit of Greek culture, and besides, endowed by nature with his countrymen's talent for metaphysics, exclaims:

> "Give me no peeping scientist, if I
> Shall judge God's grandly ordered world aright;
> But give, to plant my Cosmic survey high
> The wisest of wise Greeks, the Stagyrite."

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF ASCETICISM.

The real test of the value of any institution or organization which aims at regulating conduct is to be found in the complexion of the life produced under its influence and the character in men which it generates. By their fruits ye shall know them. Thus while the attitude of the early Christians towards the prevailing social and economic conditions was such as to merit for them neither the reproach of being rebels nor radical social reformers, the basic criterion of their activities is to be found in their own careers and character and in their outlook on life in general. This is a subject which has called forth much acrimonious criticism and which has led to much unfounded opposition to Christianity as a factor in social progress and betterment. That the world is essentially bad and that the Christian is bound to fly from it are represented as the essence of Christian teaching, and the Christian concept of life is said to be anti-social, pessimistic or impossible. Brentano finds the keynote of Christianity in the words of Our Lord to the rich young man: "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me."[1] "This," he says, "is the foundation on which the early fathers rest their teaching about earthly possessions. It was this message which made St. Francis turn his back on the world, and, as in his case, so from the beginning was it looked on as an exhortation to fly from the world. It was on this basis that the anti-social view of life held by the early Christians rested, and it was against the manner of life based on such renunciation that the heathen world directed its attacks.[2] Professor Harnach expresses practically the same opinion regarding the manner in which the church has

[1] Matt. xix, 21.

[2] "Die wirtschaftlichen Lehren des Christlichen Altertums." *Sitzungsberichte d. philosoph.—philolog. u. d. his. Classe. d. k. b. Akademie d. Wissenschaften zu München*, 1902, p. 143.

interpreted the social import of Our Lord's teaching. "They (the Catholic Churches) recognize the world-denying character of the gospel and they teach accordingly, that it is only in the form of monasticism, that is in the vita religiosa, that the true Christian life finds its expression. But they admit a lower kind of Christianity without asceticism as sufficient. . . . The Catholic doctrine is that it is only monks who can follow Christ fully." [3] The unworldiness in the Christian faith has been denounced by Socialists as "a personal, introspective, and spiritualistic theory of the universe and of life." [4]

Charges of this character are by no means new. They are as old as Christianity itself, and were never expressed with more vigor and sharpness than by the pagan opponents of Christianity in the time of the persecutions. As early as the days of Nero the Christians were accused of "hatred of the human race." [5] "We are called to account as harm-doers on another ground," says Tertullian, "and are accused of being useless in the affairs of life." [6] To the pagan opponent of Minucius Felix the Christians were "a people skulking and shunning the light, silent in public, but garrulous in corners." [7] Celsus censured the Christians as "men who separate themselves and stand aloof from all human society." [8]

The prevalence of such views, notwithstanding the equal tenacity with which the communistic character of Christianity is asserted in other quarters, is due, it is needless to say, to an entire misapprehension of the Church's teaching on asceticism and the ascetic life. This misapprehension is not confined to

[3] *What is Christianity* (Eng. Trans.), p. 79.

[4] Bax, *The Religion of Socialism*, p. 25.

[5] Tacitus, *Annals*, XV, 44.

[6] Apology, Chap. XLII. Infructuosi in negotiis dicimur.

[7] *Octavius*, Chap. VIII.

[8] Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 2. The accusation of Celsus bears out the truth of the observation made some years ago by Uhlhorn: "In reading the '*True Discourse*' we are filled with astonishment not simply because Celsus had so accurate a knowledge of Christianity . . . but more because in this the oldest polemical writing against the Christian faith whose contents we know, every argument is to be found which has been brought against it up to the present time." *The Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism*, p. 297 (Eng. Trans.).

writers on social topics, but is shared by philosophers, moralists, and historians. "The ascetic," says Ross, "be he Buddhist, Stoic, Christian or Sufi, tames lustful, grasping, vying men and transforms them into quiet, untroublesome members of society. But he may not stop here. The tamed energy of the anchorite wasting itself in fast and penance and self-torture is socially useless." [9] With few exceptions, Protestants have never grasped the true notion of Catholic renunciation, and though there are many outside the Church who hold lenient views, it is not surprising to find an eminent Cambridge professor expressing himself to the effect that "Asceticism is the reaction of the natural man from the grosser sins that shock him, and rests on as low a view of human nature as any sinner's." [10] Statements such as these can be explained only on the ground that the authors who make them never took the pains to examine seriously what is really meant by Asceticism, and what the Church actually teaches on the subject, or that separation from the Church has so completely alienated their sympathies that they are beyond all comprehension of a system of conduct which finds no full exemplification except under her influence.

That early Christianity was far from being unsocial and that the Church did not confine the full benefits of Redemption only to those who practised the ascetic manner of life, and that asceticism itself is not the monstrous scheme of existence such as it is frequently portrayed can easily be seen from the nature and history of ascetical practices as encouraged and regulated by the Church. Asceticism (ἀσκήσις) is a notion brought over by the Greeks from the sphere of athletics to that of morals, and means exercise or training, while the ascetics (ἀσκοῦντες) were the athletes, or those who by practice arrived at proficiency in some art or occupation. St. Paul frequently compared the life of the Christian to that of an athlete,[11] and made the idea familiar to the early Christians.[12] The appropriate-

[9] *Social Control*, p. 312.

[10] Gwatkin, *Early Church History to A. D.* 313, Vol. I, p. 240.

[11] I. Cor. IX, 24. I. Tim. IV, 8, etc.

[12] Die Askese, mag sie nun so benannt werden oder mag man sie, nach einer bei uns neueren allerdings seltneren Ausdrucksweise, als ein gym-

ness and force of the figure will readily appeal to those who are familiar with manly sports, and who know that the training of the athlete requires privation as well as the vigorous exercises of the gymnasium or the field, and, as in the preparations of the athlete, those of the ascetic had a two-fold character, negative and positive, one of renunciation and one of painful and unremitting labor. To the Christian mind Asceticism meant the training by which the things of the flesh could be made a sure means of attaining the things of the spirit. This view is based on the principle that man has a dual nature, animal and rational, and that he has a spiritual destiny. As an animal, his primary needs and instincts are concerned with food, drink, clothing, shelter, repose and sex, and as a rational being in an environment of civilization, he has capabilities which find expression in social, political or business activities, in the pleasures afforded by intellectual occupations, in the pursuit of success and happiness, in love, friendship, comfort, travel and the enjoyment of art under its various forms, music, literature, the drama, poetry, in sports and amusements. The question for all men, not indeed for those alone who believe in God, but preëminently for those who hope for a future life, is how are those needs of nature to be satisfied, and those capabilities to be brought into play with the purpose of gaining what each believes to be the supreme object of existence. For the Christian the question was settled by the law of the gospel. But the law required merely the minimum, anything less was sin. Over and above what was enjoined as necessary there was a wide field for the exercise of individual preference, in which the use of one's faculties and powers, animal and rational, might be made to yield more and more of spiritual profit, a field extending from the bare requirements of the law up to the highest expression of spiritual life on earth, the ecstatic rapture of the Saint.

This is the field to which the evangelical counsels were made to apply, and the observance of these counsels of perfection con-

astisches Thun (Tugend-Gymastik) bezeichnen, gehört zu den Gemeinsamkeiten des klassischen Altertums und des Urchristentums. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, p. 2.

stituted in the main the ascetic life in its greater or less degrees of perfection.

Asceticism is therefore as inseparably connected with religion as prayer or sacrifice; in fact, it cannot be separated from human life wherever serious attempts are made to raise life or conduct to a higher level of perfection.[13]

Starting then with law as the basis of conduct all Christians are bound to observe the same standard up to a certain point.[14] The counsels of perfection, or the principles of asceticism on their negative side, are concerned with curbing the purely natural desires and instincts in order to give the spiritual freer play. Primarily they deal with the animal instincts and necessities and lead to renunciation of things which in themselves are perfectly legitimate, with the purpose of reducing the domination of animal and sense life so that the higher faculties and powers may be turned into channels advantageous to salvation. In modern biology organic life is regarded as being perfect in

[13] Professor James knew an agnostic, whom he classed as an ascetic and whom he quotes as follows: Often at night in my warm bed I would feel ashamed to depend so much on the warmth, and whenever the thought would come over me I would have to get up, no matter what time of night it was and stand for a minute in the cold, just so as to prove my manhood. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 300.

[14] *Consilium proprie dictum est regula moralis hominibus generatim commendata ad perfectius vivendum ac finem ultimum plenius et expeditius consequendum.* In hoc igitur convenit consilium cum lege, quod sit regula ad finem ultimum; differt autem a lege consilium: (a) quia lex est regula *imposita* et obligatoria, consilium autem regula *commendata* et libera; ut enim loquitur S. Augustinus, quae legis sunt exiguntur, quae consilii offeruntur: "in illis Dominus debitum imperat vobis; in his autem si quid amplius supererogaveritis, in redeundo reddat vobis;" (b) quia lex est regula imposita *omnibus et singulis*, consilium regula quidem *generatim commendata*, non tamen singulis: (c) quia lex est de actu *bono*, consilium vero de actu *meliori*, qui nempe actui opposito, seu alii sibi incompossibili, praestet, per hoc tamen non significatur observationem consilii semper excellentiorem esse adimpletione legis sive in diversa materia, sive etiam in eadem; (d) quia lex est de *necessariis*, consilium de *convenientibus;* advertatur tamen, illud quod communiter est conveniens, quibusdam, ratione circumstantiarum, fieri posse in particulari vel minus bonum, vel e contra necessarium; (e) quia lex dirigit ad *finem simpliciter*, et ejus transgressio a fine consequendo impedit, consilium dirigit ad finem *melius et expeditius* consequendum. Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, p. 241 seq.

proportion to the extent of its correspondence with its environment. In asceticism the seeker for perfection tries to free himself from subjection to his physical environment by restraining as far as possible the instincts of his animal nature and the tyranny of sense. Thus on the side of renunciation Asceticism in its most widely diffused form concerns itself with the physical necessities of life, with food, drink, clothing, shelter and rest, as far as is compatible with the Christian conception of the sacredness of life and as far as circumstances will permit. Next in order is the curbing of the sex instinct, through continence, voluntary chastity and virginity. Because the demands of sex are not so imperative as those of subsistence this form of asceticism is not so widespread nor so generally inculcated. In addition to these merely negative acts of fasting, abstinence and continence other measures are resorted to to bring the flesh into subjection, such as scourging, the wearing of chains or hair shirts, uncomfortable postures, deprivation of sleep and, in some extreme cases condemned by the Church, even self-mutiliation. Joined with these are abstinence from the pleasures of the world, from society, striving for honors and emoluments and even withdrawal from social life as a means to a fuller realization of the life of the soul; for the counsels of perfection can be applied to everything covered by positive law under the aspect of duration, mode, quantity, etc.

On its positive side Asceticism aims at turning the nobler faculties and capabilities of men to the highest account in attaining the supreme goal of life, to make such use of all that nature offers that the soul will be aided, not impeded, in its quest of the highest good. This form of Asceticism finds its fullest expression in prayer, meditation and contemplation of heavenly things and in the raptures of the mystic. A mistaken idea of asceticism is that the life of contemplation is necessarily one of complete isolation. Except in rare cases, and then only after years of striving, the most earnest ascetics made use of certain aids to enable them to attain the highest degree of disembodiment or rapture. It is true they were totally absorbed in spiritual things, as the philosopher or scientist might be in mundane matters, to the exclusion of all interest in their sur-

roundings, but they found a bond with their physical environment in the Sacred Books, in pious conversation and in works of mercy.

From this it can be seen that there are many kinds and many degrees of the ascetical life, and that it is a mistake to regard asceticism as merely renunciation. It is much more, as is clear from the fact that when it is organized, when asceticism takes on its social character as monasticism, the positive practices of perfection receive even greater weight than the negative. But though the evangelical counsels are not imperative, they are recommended to all, if not to each, and consequently the Christian body contains numbers of earnest souls to whom they have appealed, and all these, though not in the same degree, are ascetics, varying in their abstinence and their endeavors from those whose struggles barely keep them within the law up to those who have succeeded in emancipating themselves from sense domination. The course followed by all is the same vigilance and struggle, and it is because of the negative in asceticism, but more because of what is positive, that life and civilization are moulded until they become truly Christian.

That this is the natural course and result will be clear from a little reflection. The law requires merely a minimum. Violation of it is sin. But progress is never satisfied with a minimum. Its aim is perfection, and in the evangelical counsels is to be found the field for the exercise of personal initiative. While some few emancipate themselves from dependence on physical nature to a greater or less degree, the great mass of mankind are not expected to do so except in a limited manner. Each, however, in his own sphere and according to his abilities must struggle to remove the hindrances to salvation, and to make of the world and of society the kingdom of God on earth, to see that everything in human relations is permeated with the spirit of Christ, and thus to transform whatever may have been a hindrance into an aid to salvation. Thus earnestly pursuing this object the Christians, when political conditions changed and when they were free to lead their lives as they saw fit, accepted what in the days of persecution they had rejected, and from the desire to make of their earthly environment a pre-

lude to a heavenly destiny, art, society, politics, pleasures were all transfused with a new spirit.

Admitting, then, that the ascetical life was considered to be the highest type of Christian perfection in the primitive church, the question arises, how far did the Christians, because they entertained such views, deserve to be characterized as unsocial world-fugitives and useless members of society, and to what extent did the prevalence of such opinions make of Christianity an organization destructive of the ordinary business of life. The examination of this question is more than ordinarily pertinent at the present time in view of the teaching of Tolstoy and so many others in Russia who advocate this unsocial and inactive type of Christianity. Over and above this, in order to remove a serious reproach from the early Church it is of interest to know whether a Christian of those days could conscientiously take part in the business, the pleasures and ordinary pursuits of life, or was he condemned because of his religion to a career of sullen aloofness from his fellow-men and their interests.

On the assumption that asceticism in its relation to conduct differs from law not in extent, but in intensity, it becomes manifest that the gauge of Christian influence must be found in the latter, not in the former; for except in very few instances ascetical practices were not made obligatory on all the faithful. These were, on the negative side Fasting, and on the positive side rules connected with the Liturgy and Ritual. Thus fasting on certain days in the week and regular attendance at the divine offices and frequentation of the sacraments comprised practically everything of an ascetical character that was distinctive of the Christian community as a whole. These few observances cannot be considered sufficiently engrossing to have cut off the Christians from the great mass of their fellow-citizens. There were, it is true, many among the Christians who led lives of greater austerity, in fact, it is reasonable to suppose that most of the faithful did strive in some way to attain evangelical perfection; but the number of those who deserved to be considered ascetics in the strict sense of the word—men or women whose whole lives were spent in good works—was, compared to the entire body of Christians, never large, and even from the

most violent opponents of the ascetical life the example and deeds of these men and women when examined in detail receive, generally speaking, approval, not condemnation.

In all the other affairs of life the Christians were free to conduct themselves as they saw fit, provided they observed the law and kept themselves free from the contagion of error and vice. As they had no desire to segregate themselves, because they were in the world to win it, the matter of adjusting themselves to their environment was one of no small difficulty. The entire social structure was so thoroughly interpenetrated with the spirit and customs of paganism, and was based on such a low estimate of life and such a coarse conception of morality that the Christian might find himself at any moment unwittingly participating in rites or sharing in usages contrary to the spirit of his religion. As long as the Church was composed mainly of persons drawn from the lower walks of life, there was no great danger to morality from contact with luxury or from excessive indulgence in enervating dissipations. The number of converts, however, from all classes was so enormous during the comparative peace under the Antonines up to the reign of Marcus Aurelius, that the old distinction between pagan and Christian seemed to be in danger of being lost sight of. Hence after that time we find the Christian moralists outlining in detail the Christian ideal of private and public morality, of family life and personal conduct. In no case do they counsel the Christians to withdraw from intercourse with their neighbors, or to eschew legitimate pleasures. Any prohibitions which they made in their eyes arose from the special circumstances of the time, and because the tone of life and the recognized conventionalities offered a real menace to Christian faith and morality. Even such rigorists as Hermas [15] and Origen [16] do not discountenance intercourse

[15] "Those who have never searched for the truth, nor investigated the nature of the Divinity, but have simply believed, when they devote themselves to and become mixed up with business, and wealth and heathen friendships and many other actions of this world do not perceive the parables of Divinity." *Pastor, Mandatum*, x, 1.

[16] "But indeed they do, in a sense, separate themselves and stand aloof from those who are aliens from the commonwealth of God and strangers to His covenants in order that they may live as citizens of heaven." *Contra Celsum*, viii, 5.

with pagans and participation in the affairs of daily life except when these are a menace to right living. The fine line of distinction between what was right and what was wrong is nowhere better drawn than by Tertullian who will not have it that the Christians are unsocial. "But although he (St. Paul) does not prohibit us from having our conversation with idolators and adulterers and the other criminals saying 'otherwise ye would go out of the world,' of course, he does not so slacken those reins of conversation, that since it is necessary for us both to live and to mingle with sinners, we may be able to sin with them too. Where there is the intercourse of life which the Apostle concedes, there is sinning, which no one permits. To live with heathens is lawful, to die with them is not. Let us live with all; let us be glad with them out of community of nature, not of superstition. We are peers in soul, not in discipline; fellow-possessors of the world, not of error." [17]

No writer among the early Christians had a more lively horror of idolatry than did Tertullian; yet he is so far from considering that Christian duty required abstention from all social communication that at times he seems to be willing to stretch a point for the sake of friendship. There were festivities of various kinds such as the conferring of the white toga, espousals, nuptials, name-givings "with which the breath of idolatry was mixed," at which to his mind it was perfectly legitimate for Christians to be present. He bases his opinion on the fact that the causes of these festal gatherings are clean because the manly garb and the marital ring or union did not originate in heathen worship, and God prohibits neither nuptials nor name-giving. "Let me be invited," he says, "and let not the title of the ceremony be 'assistant at a sacrifice' and the discharge of my good offices is at the service of my friends. . . . But since the evil one has so surrounded the world with idolatry, it will be lawful for us to be present at some ceremonies which see us doing service to a man, not an idol." [18] The same liberality of spirit was not shown by Tertullian in his views regarding marriages

[17] *De Idololatria*, XIV.
[18] *De Idololatria*, XVI.

between Christians and pagans. He, as did others of his time, strove earnestly to prevent as far as possible,[19] such unions because of the dangers to faith and to domestic peace and happiness which they so frequently led to; but his own writings nevertheless show that such marriages frequently took place,[20] and yet neither he nor anyone else ever thought of urging the Christian spouse to sue for divorce.

Thus while the Christians "did not wish to abolish social intercourse," [21] nor to give up their gentile friendships,[22] except for conscience sake, it was abundantly clear to them that, on grounds other than those of scrupulous adherence to religious requirements, it was impossible to mingle freely with the pagans as friends. The Christian and pagan conception of life were too far apart not to cause a profound difference even in matters of etiquette. The elevated views and finer feelings of the Christians showed themselves in a profound esteem of the amenities of life, so that they were constantly offended by the coarse materialism, the bad manners and the utter lack of decorum shown by their heathen associates. Clement of Alexandria gives a picture of heathen society in the third century which shows that manners have not improved since Petronius wrote his "Banquet of Trimalchio." Both depict the same vulgar ostentation, gross sensuality, ribaldry, uncouthness and excesses. The prevailing customs and fashions find in Clement an observing but unsparing critic and if he goes into detail in describing the fashions and orgies which came under his notice he does so with the purpose of pointing out how the Christian should comport himself, and how close the relationship is between manners and morals. And yet bad as was the general tone of private and social life there is no hint in the works of Clement or any other writer of the time that the Christians should abandon society or social relations as being incompatible with the demands of their faith.

[19] The legislation of Callistus was made necessary because of the impossibility which some wealthy Christian matrons experienced in finding suitable husbands in their own class.

[20] *Ad Uxorem*, II, 2.

[21] Clement of Alexandria. *Paedagogus*, II, 1.

[22] Tertullian, *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, XI.

Infidelity and vice were rampant everywhere and had to be guarded against. The care and minuteness, however, with which rules regarding deportment and good manners are laid down, prove that unsociability was not considered to be a refuge against these dangers and that the Christians played a prominent part in the ordinary life of the time. Clement of Alexandria discusses all the various phases of private and social life, clothes, personal adornment, dining, conversation, etc., and shows how thoroughly he realized the importance of taste and good manners and thus of social intercourse.

The luxury and extravagance of the wealthy classes in the Roman Empire in matters of food and drink had not escaped the scorn of the pagan moralists and satirists, and it is not surprising to find Clement admonishing his readers "that there is discrimination to be employed in reference to food." [23] The eagerness which people exhibited in procuring for themselves lampreys from the Straits of Sicily, eels of the Mæander, mullets of Sciathus, oysters from Abydos, turbots from Attica, Egyptian snipes and Median pea fowl, etc., and "absolutely sweeping the world with a drag-net to gratify their luxurious tastes" was nothing but a disease. The Christians should look on such luxury as irrational, futile and not human, and should not "bury all the good of existence here in a life that by and by will end." They were not on the contrary "to abstain wholly from various kinds of food, but not to be entirely absorbed by them." "Food should be simple and plain—ministering to life, not luxury—and conducive to health and strength." Christians might partake of what was set before them out of respect to him who invited them, but they should avoid slavish habits and excess, and take what was offered to them in a decorous way, "keeping the hand and couch and chin free from stains." [24]

In regard to wine-drinking, while those who adopted an austere life and drink water, the medicine of temperance, are to be admired, it is proper at times to take wine by way of physic, and even for purposes of relaxation and enjoyment. "For wine

[23] *Paedagogus*, II, I.
[24] *Ibid.*

makes the man who has drunk it more benignant than before, more agreeable to his boon companions, kinder to his domestics, and more pleasant to his friends." "The miserable wretches who 'expel temperance from conviviality,' and who think excess in drinking to be the happiest life, should be a warning to Christians lest they should fall into such excesses and become a laughing-stock to others. Temperance should be the rule. It was advisable to avoid imported wines, not to drink many kinds of wine" for one suffices to the temperate drinker, and it was advisable to mix wine with water.[25] Especial regard should be paid to decency in drinking. There should be no contortions of the face, nor greedy grasping of the cup, nor unseemly motion of the eyes. Nor should they besprinkle the chin nor splash the garments while gulping down all the liquor at once "the face all but filling the bowl and being drowned in it." [26]

The general rule in regard to food, clothes and vessels and everything else belonging to the house was that they should be serviceable, and suitable to one's person, age, pursuits and time of life. "Costly house-furnishings and gold and silver plate were unenviable possessions, being difficult to keep and not adapted for use. Hence vessels of chased glass, so fragile that one feared to drink from them, and silver couches, and pans, and vinegar-saucers, and trenchers and bowls; and besides these, vessels of silver and gold, some for serving food, of easily cleft cedar and thyine wood, and ebony, and tripods fashioned of ivory, and couches with silver feet and inlaid with ivory, and folding-doors of beds studded with gold and variegated with tortoise-shell, and bed clothes of purple and other colors difficult to produce, proofs of tasteless luxury, cunning devices of envy and effeminacy, are all to be relinquished as having nothing worthy of our pains." [27]

Attendance at banquets was perfectly legitimate; but there should be no burlesque singing, no choirs and dances and Egyptian clapping of the hands and such disorderly frivolities. Every improper sight and sound should be excluded. They

[25] *Ibid.*, II, 2. [26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*, Chap. III

should be on their guard against whatever titillates eye and ear and effeminates, especially the music of the pipe and flute which should be left to shepherds and those engrossed in idolatry. The banquet, however, was not to be dull or lifeless, for temperate harmonies were allowable, "liquid" harmonies, however, which through pernicious arts in the modulations of tones train to effeminancy, were to be banished from the robust life of the Christian.[28] The subject of laughter was also worthy of consideration, but men should not laugh on all occasions because they are laughing animals, any more than the horse neighs on all occasions because he is a neighing animal. Because laughter was perfectly natural it should not be eradicated but it should have its limits and should be indulged in only at suitable times. People should not laugh perpetually, for that is going beyond bounds, nor in the presence of elderly persons or others worthy of respect unless they indulge in pleasantry for our amusement. Pleasantry is allowable not waggery, for men are entitled to release the over-tension of their serious pursuits, and one need not be gloomy, only grave, "for laughter when given vent to in the right manner indicates orderliness, but when it issues differently it shows a lack of restraint." [29]

On some subjects the Christians should take a very decided stand, they should guard themselves against hearing or seeing what was obscene, and from filthy speaking they should entirely abstain "and stop the mouth of those who practise it by stern looks and averting the face, and by what is called making a mock of one, and often also by a harsher mode of speech." Prudery and pruriency were also objectionable and people should not hesitate to use the words knee and leg "for such members and the activity put forth by them are not obscene." [30]

Dignity and decorum should be observed in all social gatherings. There should be no jibing and witticisms at the expense of others, no unseemly postures, people should help themselves sparingly and eat moderately; but the conversation might be lively, and joking of the proper kind was perfectly allowable; "as for instance before a bashful and silent youth one might

[28] *Ibid.*, Chap. IV. [29] *Ibid.*, VI.
[30] *Ibid.*

by way of pleasantry speak thus: This son of mine (the silent one) is perpetually speaking."[31]

Though the use of unguents was permissible as a means to alleviate pain, anointing the body with perfumed ointment, and the use of perfumes by men or women was an evidence of sensuality utterly unbecoming in a Christian who should "give forth the odor not of ointments, but of goodness." [32]

The gradual abolition of sumptuary regulations in the time of the Empire shows what a heavy toll Rome had paid for her conquests in thus being led to exchange the *Mores Patrum* for the luxury of the Orient. The protests of the Stoic moralists and the Satirists could not check the innovation nor restore the dignity and simplicity which had characterized the life of the Romans in times gone by. It is not surprising that the softer manners, which had received the sanction of law, should have aroused the ire of the Christians and that they should have striven to save the people from the effeminacy into which they had fallen. "What ought to be said," says Clement, "of love of ornament, and dyeing of wool, and variety of colors, and fastidiousness about gems, and exquisite working of gold, and still more, of artificial hair and wreathed curls; and furthermore, of staining the eyes, and plucking out hairs and painting with rouge and white lead, and dyeing of the hair, and the wicked arts that are employed in such deceptions." [33]

To oppose such vanities is not in itself an evidence of unsociability or misanthropy. Such foibles find few defenders.

In regard to the clothing of men, Clement advises that it should show no trace of effeminacy, nor should it be cut in an extravagant style, but should be simple, of white color, clean, and substantial and "suited to age, person, figure, nature, pursuits." [34] The clothing of women should be like that of men, though perhaps of softer material, but not foolishly thin or of curious texture; "for these superfluous and diaphanous materials are the proof of a weak mind, covering as they do the shame of the body with a slender veil." [35] Except when on a

[31] *Ibid.*, Chap. VII.
[32] *Paedagogus*, II, 11.
[33] *Ibid.*, II, 11.
[34] *Ibid.*, Chap. VIII.
[35] *Paedagogus*, III, 11.

journey men should not wear shoes "for to go with bare feet is most suitable for exercise, and best adapted for health and ease;" women, however for protection and for the sake of modesty should wear white shoes.[36] Men were permitted to wear a seal-ring on the little finger, and the device should be honorable, a dove, or a fish or a ship scudding before the wind, or a musical lyre or a ship's anchor [37]—women should neither wear rings nor golden necklaces nor collars nor anklets nor should they allow their ears to be pierced [38] Men should wear their hair short unless it be curly, and they should not be seen with twisted locks resembling womanish ringlets. The beard should be unshaved, but the moustache, for the sake of cleanliness, "should be cut round, not by the razor, for that is not well-bred, but by a pair of cropping scissors." Women should "bind up their hair simply along the neck with a plain hair pin." There should be no meretricious plaiting of the hair, nor putting it up in tresses, and "additions of other people's hair are entirely to be rejected, as it is a most sacrilegious thing for spurious hair to shade the head, covering the skull with dead locks." Neither is the hair to be dyed nor grey hair to have its color changed, for "old age which conciliates trust is not to be concealed." [39]

All the vices of the fashionable life of the period are passed in review by Clement. He speaks of the women who pass the days shut up in their rooms, curling their locks, anointing their cheeks, painting their eyes, dyeing their hair and practising the other pernicious arts of luxury, and in the evening creeping out by candle-light as out of a hole, "for drunkenness and the dimness of the light aid what they have put on;" of men who followed the same frivolous pursuits, effeminate creatures, in fine and transparent clothes, chewing mastich and smelling of perfume.[40] To give point to these denunciations there were some Christians who were falling into the fashionable vices of the time, and who as Cyprian said, lapsed because "a long

[36] *Ibid.*, II, 12.
[37] *Ibid.*, III, 1.
[38] *Ibid*, II, 13; III, 11.
[39] *Ibid.*, III, 11.
[40] *Ibid.*, III, 2.

peace had corrupted discipline." In Carthage, as in Alexandria, men defaced their beards, women dyed their complexions, falsified their eyes from what God had made them, and stained their hair with a falsehood.[41]

In opposition to the feverish desire for pleasure and excitement the life of the Christian should be characterized by composure, tranquillity, calmness and peace. [42] "It is not enough for the chaste to be pure, they must give all diligence, to be beyond the range of censure, so that they may not only be faithful, but appear worthy of trust." [43]

In words which recall Cæsar's policy of defence by aggression, Clement warns his coreligionists that mere adherence to the law was not sufficient "for those that do all that is lawful, quickly fall into doing what is unlawful." [44]

To instil earnestness into the lives of people wholly addicted to pleasure, to teach them to acquire high purposes and to cast off vice and frivolity was a task requiring zeal and courage in the decadent days of the Roman Empire. But as the sword hung constantly over their heads, renunciation of pleasure was a good preparation for the sacrifice of life itself which they might at any moment be called upon to make. For, said Tertullian: "Pleasures must be discarded whose softness may weaken the courage of faith. I know not whether the wrist accustomed to the palm-leaf-like bracelet will endure the hardness of the chain; I know not whether the leg that has rejoiced in the anklet will suffer itself to be squeezed into the gyve. I fear the neck beset with pearl and emerald nooses will give no room to the broad sword. Wherefore let us meditate on hardships and we shall not feel them. Let us abandon luxuries and we shall not regret them. . . . But Christians always and now more than ever; pass their time not in gold, but in iron; the stoles of martyrdom are preparing. . . . Do you go forth arrayed in the cosmetics and ornaments of prophets and apostles; drawing your whiteness from your simplicity, your ruddy hue from modesty; painting your eyes with bashfulness, and your

[41] *De Lapsis*, 5 and 6.
[42] *Ibid.*, III, 11.
[43] *Paedagogus*, II, 7.
[44] *Ibid.*, II, 1.

mouth with silence; implanting in your ears the words of God, fitting on your necks the yoke of Christ." [45] To abandon the ever-inviting follies of fashionable life is neither anti-social nor destructive of social life. Christian women willingly did so, and Christian apologists compared their simple, chaste and natural lives with the vain, immodest and restless lives of the pagans as one of the indubitable triumphs of the Christian faith. "This Sappho of yours," says Tatian, comparing the pagan and Christian estimate of women, "is a lewd, love-sick female and sings her own wantonness; but all our women are chaste, and the maidens at their distaffs sing of divine things more nobly than that damsel of yours. Wherefore be ashamed, you who are professed disciples of women, yet scoff at those of the sex who hold our doctrine, as well as at the solemn assemblies they frequent." [46]

One feature of ancient life in which the distinction between heathens and Christians was absolutely drawn, was that connected with pagan festivals and public amusements. To abstain from these meant withdrawal from practically everything of a public social character in the Roman Empire. For the Christians there was no middle way. The calendar was crowded with the feast days of the various deities, processions were held in their honor, solemn banquets and public sacrifices were of frequent occurrence, and against any participation in such worship or such rites the Christians were absolutely barred. "You do not visit exhibitions," says the heathen Cæcilius, "you have no concern in public displays; you reject the public banquets and abhor the sacred contests." [47] To have cut themselves off from pleasures and to have incurred the censure and hatred of their neighbors, was a sacrifice for conscience sake, which can hardly be classed as anti-social.[48]

Much more remarkable was the refusal of the early Christians to indulge in the various forms of amusement offered in the Theatre, the Stadium, the Amphitheatre or the Circus. In

[45] *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, 13.
[46] *Address to the Greeks*, XXIII.
[47] Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, XII.
[48] Tertullian, *De Idololatria, passim.*

these the passion of the people for new forms of excitement found constant satisfaction. In this regard every city in the Empire was a Rome in replica. It may be that some elements of pagan worship were connected with these shows;[49] but they were not always obvious, and it required strength and resolution not to be led by the impulses which draw men to follow crowds. In Rome the Circus or the Colosseum was large enough to accommodate all or nearly all the adult freemen. Thither the people flocked in droves. There were to be seen spectacles horrible but alluring. Frequently must the reluctant Christians have heard the arguments of pagan friends who tried to prove that there was nothing derogatory to worship in enjoyment. "God is the God of all alike," says Celsus. "He is good. He stands in need of nothing, and He is without jealousy. What then, is there to hinder those who are most devoted to His service from taking part in public feasts?" [50]

Notwithstanding all these influences, the Christians, with an unerring instinct of what their faith meant to humanity, incurred the reproaches and the enmity of their pagan neighbors and isolated themselves. "We are forbidden," says Theophilus, "so much as to witness shows of gladiators, lest we become partakers and abettors of murders. But neither may we see the other spectacles, lest our eyes and ears be defiled, participating in the utterances there sung." [51] "You slaughter animals for the purpose of eating their flesh," says Tatian, "and you supply a cannibal banquet for your souls." [52] The delicate sensibility regarding the sacredness of life made the Christians feel "that

[49] Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, XXXVIII. Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, II.

[50] Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 21. Tertullian thought it necessary to write a special treatise to combat such arguments. "Perhaps some among you are allured by the views of the heathens, who in this matter are wont to press us with arguments such as these: (1) That the exquisite enjoyments of ear and eye we have in things external are not in the least opposed to religion in the mind and conscience; and (2) that surely no offence is offered to God, in any human enjoyment, by way of our pleasures which it is not sinful to partake of in its own time and place with all our honor and reverence secured to Him." *De Spectaculis*, Chap. I.

[51] *Ad Autolycum*, III, 15.

[52] *Address to the Greeks*, XV.

to see a man put to death was much the same as killing him." [53]

With equal regard for the necessity of keeping free from the contamination of paganism, and preserving the purity of their morals, the Christians discountenanced games of chance [54] and the enervating luxury of the private and public baths. The great Thermæ had become nurseries of immodesty and vice. While their purpose and usefulness were not questioned, the undoubted influence for evil which they exercised caused the Christians to avoid them.[55] "I do not," says Tertullian, "at the Saturnalia bathe myself at dawn that I may not lose both day and night; yet I bathe at a decent and healthful hour, which preserves me both in heat and blood." Many of the prohibitions which are laid down in this matter can be understood only with reference to prevailing abuses, to cases where persons used the baths as often as seven times a day, to the presence of male attendants in the baths for women,[56] and to the evils of mixed bathing where men and women used the same establishment.[57]

Thus to have trained the world to more serious pursuits than those of social scrambling, personal adornment and participation in brutal and immoral spectacles, and to have elevated the human mind above the pleasures of animal-baiting and gladiatorial contests, even at the cost of shutting themselves off from the life around them, may justly be regarded as a praise-worthy achievement of the early Christians. "It was one of the most important services of Christianity, that besides quickening greatly our benevolent affections, it definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life as a matter of amusement, or of simple convenience, and thereby formed a new standard higher than any which then existed in the world." [58]

[53] Athenagoras, *Legatio*, XXXV.

[54] Even the civil authorities were compelled at times to take steps to check the evils of dicing (*Adv. Aleatores*, VI). In addition to the moral evils connected with this form of gambling, there were frequent invocations of pagan deities which repelled the Christians. *Adv. Aleatores*, VII.

[55] *Apology*, XLII.

[56] Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*, III, 5.

[57] Cyprian, *De Habitu Virginum*, XIX, 10 seq.

[58] Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 19.

The uniform policy, therefore, pursued by the Christians towards private as well as corporate and social activities was to elevate the tone of life by freeing it from the influences of polytheism and corruption. This was nowhere more clearly shown than in the sphere of industrial and commercial activities. No problem which arose in the early church required more careful handling than that connected with labor and business. The first difficulty arose from the fact that all manual labor was looked on with contempt. "The mechanic's occupation," said Cicero, "is degrading. A work-shop is incompatible with anything noble." [59] Productive occupations were very largely carried on by slaves who had displaced the free middle-class, and artizan and slave were considered to occupy about the same place in the social scale. How deep this contempt for workers was is luminously exhibited in the attacks made on the Church by pagan philosophers, who could find no stronger term for their contempt of Christianity than that it was the religion of "workers in wool and leather and fullers and persons of the most uninstructed and rustic character." [60] In the second place business and industry in form and method lay under the prevailing incubus of polytheism and materialism. The cultus of paganism absorbed the activities of many trades and callings and practically the entire field of art, while trade and commerce were carried on solely with a view to profit and were characterized by lying, fraud, and misrepresentation.

Not only did the Christians from the beginning assert the nobility and necessity of labor,[61] but they gave practical evidence of their convictions by admitting not only artizans, but slaves to full membership in the Church.

"Among us," says Athenagoras, "you will find uneducated persons and artizans, who, if they are unable to prove in words the benefit of our doctrine, yet by their deeds, exhibit the benefit arising from their persuasion of its truth." [62] Many callings

[59] *De Officiis*, I, 42.

[60] Origen, *Contra Celsum*, III, 55.

[61] "For the Lord our God hates the slothful. For no one of those who worship God ought to be idle." *Apostolic Constitutions*, IV, 2.

[62] *Legatio*, XI.

were by their very nature closed to Christians, but by abandoning them, they did nothing subversive of ordinary industrial activity. "I will confess, however, without hesitation," says Tertullian, "that there are some who in a sense may complain of Christians that they are a sterile race; as for instance, pimps and panders, and bath suppliers; assassins and poisoners and sorcerers; soothsayers, too, diviners and astrologers. But it is a noble fruit of Christians, that they have no fruits for such as these." [63]

In all the other fields of business activity, except those connected with Idolatry [64] or immoral in themselves, the Christians took the ground that such activities were legitimate. Even the clergy were counselled to gain a livelihood for themselves by work,[65] with the understanding, of course, as is clear from the reproaches of Cyprian to his suffragans,[66] that such activities should not be prejudicial to the obligations of their calling. Not only were the Christians urged to engage in productive occupations, but to aid others in finding work.[67] It was necessary for them furthermore to practice righteousness in business to avoid its temptations, covetousness and mendacity.[68] They were never to be guilty of misrepresentation or deceit,[69] and they should have fixed prices. "Let not him who sells or buys aught name two prices for what he sells or buys," says Clement of Alexandria, "but stating the net price, and studying to speak the truth, if he get not his price, he gets the truth, and is rich in the possessions of rectitude." To give definite expression to their hatred of dishonesty in business they would accept no gifts from corrupt dealers.[70]

[63] *Apology*, Chap. XLII.

[64] Tertullian, *De Idololatria, passim.*

[65] IV Con. Carthag, Can. 51 Clericus, quantumlibet verbo Dei eruditus, artificio victum quaerat. Can. 52. Clericus victum et vestimentum sibi artificiolo vel agricultura absque officii sui detrimento, paret. Can. 53. Omnes clerici, qui ad operandum validiores sunt, et artificiola et literas discant.

[66] *De Lapsis*, VI.

[67] Cyprian, *Ep.* XI.

[68] Tertullian, *De Idololatria*, Chap. XI.

[69] Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, V, 18.

[70] *Apostolic Constitutions*, IV, 6.

Thus through their teaching and practice in industrial and commercial matters they laid the foundations of a new social regime by rehabilitating manual labor as an honorable calling and by insisting on the necessity of business honesty. From the wreck of a social system, reduced practically to the two classes of slave-owners and slaves, they showed how it was possible to construct a new order by fostering and defending the self-respecting middle-class. In view of the difficulties they had to contend with, it seems hardly just to refer to their influence as "social noxiousness" and to say they were "inimical to business activity." [71]

Hence a survey of the influence of Christianity as a social factor and of the views of the early Christians regarding personal and social conduct and the subject of amusements and pleasures gives no ground for the belief that they were anti-social or unduly introspective or that the Christian religion as they understood it was inimical to the legitimate activities called forth by the needs of society. The Christians set their faces against excesses in all departments of life, they inculcated strict morals and complete self-control. To attain these it was necessary to do more than merely to abstain from guilt in things unlawful. The spiritual heights which these early followers of Christ hoped to reach could only be attained through earnestness and discipline, through asceticism; and "the eternal truth of asceticism is that a man has to master himself, has to bring his being into subjection to the laws of health, and to the higher laws of holiness; that discipline is needed in every sphere; that the energies and appetites must be subdued and ruled." [72]

Most persons will perhaps not object to the asceticism which shows itself in a well-regulated life free from vice and moderately directed to some intellectual or spiritual pre-eminence; but even the extreme cases of self-abnegation seen in the lives of anchorites and Stylites, and which by many writers are taken to represent the normal in ascetical effort, and which have

[71] Brentano, *loc. cit.*, p. 162.
[72] Hugh Black, *Culture and Restraint*, p. 164.

been made the object of criticism and condemnation, were not without justification. "When we think of the whole situation of men who were set to keep themselves unspotted from evil, we are not surprised to find ascetic exercises creeping in, due chiefly to the necessary protest against the terrible evils of pagan life." [73] It was necessary to give a world sunk in vice a striking object-lesson. If the dormant or perverted moral feelings were to be restored, heroic treatment was required. Beside, the times were times of sacrifice, faith hoped for its crown in martyrdom. Life was a *mora finis* and death the penalty of sin, why then not face the issue and meet the Terror itself. "The metaphysical mystery, recognized by common sense, that he who feeds on death that feeds on men possesses life supereminently and excellently, and meets best the secret demands of the universe, is the truth of which asceticism has been the faithful champion. The folly of the cross, so inexplicable by the intellect, has yet its indestructible vital meaning." [74] When the Romans wished to make a man expiate some crime against society they relegated him to an island and deprived him of fire and water, why should a Christian hesitate to undergo a like penalty for sin against God. He too might find a place of exile and deprive himself of creature comforts for the moral benefit of society.

Life was not held in such high esteem then as now. The pagans bartered it away for transitory pleasure; the Christian used it to gain eternal joy: both were reckless, the pagan in taking, the Christian in giving; one was dominated by egotism, the other by charity. The generosity and the charity of the Christian triumphed, and society at large was the gainer. Hence even the asceticism of the desert or the pillar was not fruitless: the courage there manifested was not lost. It found its fruition in the purer lives and more ardent faith of all who were moved by such heroism.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[74] James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 364.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The First National Conference of Catholic Charities. Edited by The Executive Committee of the Conference. National Capital Press. Washington, D. C., 1910. Pp. 450. Price, $2.00

In this Report of the Proceedings of the First National Conference of Catholic Charities, which has just come from the press, a distinct and welcome addition has been made to Catholic sociological literature. The Report deals with the matters which came before the National Conference of Catholic Charities, held at the Catholic University, Washington, D. C., during the month of September, 1910.

A glance at the table of contents will suffice to satisfy the reader that the Conference deserves to be called both national and general. Cities, states, and dioceses in every section of the country are represented in the reports submitted; topics touching upon practically every phase of the question of dependency are presented for discussion; while the men and women to whom the various papers were entrusted, are thoroughly representative of Catholic thought and experience along the line of charitable endeavor. The Report itself, is the story of Catholic achievement in the field of charity and, because in its pages will be found the answer to questions which, heretofore, many have asked but none have been able to answer, the volume will be sure to find a welcome.

The avowed purpose of the Conference was to determine upon the most practical methods of dealing with the various problems which present themselves to the charity worker. Still there is reflected in the papers and discussions a fixed determination to remain faithful to Catholic ideals and give due emphasis to the spiritual side of relief work. The sermon of Most Reverend Archbishop Blenk of New Orleans, on "The Spiritual Element of Charity," delivered at the opening Mass, and which appears upon the pages of the Report, is the keynote of the whole convention. The Catholic tradition of giving for the soul's sake, is not to be forgotten. Giving must not degenerate to the level of mere philanthropy.

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that fidelity to Catholic ideals is set up as an obstacle in the way of progress. On the contrary, it is recognized that the wholesome and enduring enthusiasm which finds its inspiration in spiritual ideals may also find a most fitting outlet in the means and methods which make for real substantial progress.

That the Conference was animated by a truly progressive spirit, is evidenced by the nature and diversity of the problems discussed. The importance of preventive work, of organization, social action, method and study, received due emphasis; all the problems of modern life were taken up, and a general effort was made to constitute the experience of the past, as the teacher of the present. Turning over the pages of the Report, one finds reflected in the papers and discussions, along with the determination to abide by Catholic ideals, the determination also, to seize upon all that is best in modern methods and turn it to account. Hence we find papers upon such topics as these: The Purchase and Preparation of Food; Hygiene of the Home; Tuberculosis among the Poor; Probation Work; Social Settlements; Care of the Unemployed; Fresh Air Homes.

Aside from the Catholic and progressive spirit which characterized the sessions of the Congress, perhaps the feature which stands out most prominently is the amount of time and attention given to problems which center around the home. Faithful to the teachings of Catholic Philosophy, the Conference insisted that the unity of the family should be maintained whenever this is at all possible. Along with those already indicated which bear upon the home, we find papers upon such topics as, Legal Aid to the Poor; The Friendly Visitor; Temperance Work Among the Poor; and a general discussion concerning the dependent Family, in which men and women of wide experience took part. A thought brought out in the discussion of Hospital Dispensaries is particularly worthy of consideration. The writer urges that these Dispensaries be thrown open to a wider circle of clients, and made to embrace those who, while not dependent, are unable to secure the medical assistance which they or their families may need. Diseases and defects of children—weak eyes, bad teeth, adenoids—which are often neglected might thus receive proper treatment, and the wage-earners themselves, by a little timely assistance might be rendered better fitted to support themselves and their families.

The main discussions come under four general headings: 1. The

State in Relation to Charity. 2. The Church and Social Reform. 3. Dependency, and 4. Delinquency.

Concerning the relation of the State to Catholic Charities, it is a fact brought out in the city, state and diocesan reports submitted to the Conference, that the general attitude of public officials toward Catholic Charities is that of absolute fairness.

Perhaps the progressive spirit of the Conference nowhere shows itself more plainly than in the papers and discussions which have to do with "The Church and Social Reform." The unanimous opinion of the speakers and writers seem to be that the Catholic social worker should be in the front ranks of every movement which aims at the rational relief or prevention of poverty.

In the matter of Delinquency, another wide range of problems receive attention. Temperance Work Among the Poor, Prison Visiting, Loss of Faith Among the Poor, are among the subjects of papers and discussions, while particular emphasis is laid upon the tremendous possibilities of the Juvenile Court.

Among the problems bearing upon particular classes of dependents, the problems of the child are considered of primary importance. Juvenile Probation; The Placing Out of Children; The Big Brother; Fresh Air Homes; The Institutional Care of Children; all these are discussed with an earnestness indicating a deep and sincere solicitude for the welfare of those whose characters are in the making. The home is advocated for the child wherever practicable. The problem of "The Protection of Young Girls in Modern Cities" is also presented for consideration, and the Report offers the welcome announcement, that permanent committees have already been formed in many of our large cities for the purpose of offering protection, advice, and assistance where there is need for them.

On the whole, the Report reflects, as no previous work has done, the general trend of Catholic thought concerning the problems of Dependency and Delinquency.

Some statistical information is given concerning general conditions, but the figures are necessarily far from complete. None realize more fully than those who are back of the project that the work is only begun. Still a most encouraging beginning has been made and we shall not have turned over many pages of this Report before we realize that the right beginning has been made, and in the right way. Those who seek the inspiration that comes

from example, and those who are looking for a most satisfying if not exhaustive treatment of the general problem of charity from a Catholic standpoint will do well to look between the covers of this volume.

M. F. McEvoy.

A Medieval Garner. Human Documents from the Four Centuries preceding the Reformation. Selected, translated and annotated by G. G. Coulton, M. A., with 46 illustrations. 8o. Constable and Company, Ltd., London, 1910. Pp. xvi + 727.

The learned author tells us that these records represent thirty years' study among all kinds of medieval writings, and we can well believe so, as he has certainly searched with an antiquarian's patience through a huge mass of medieval documents and thrown together some three hundred and thirty-one first-hand excerpts from the same.

But really, allowing all due credit to his patience and sincerity, one cannot help asking oneself of what real use is such a book. After all, it is just another of those dreadful books of anecdotes which, even when true, have about as much relation to history as a bizarre collection of antiques in a newly-rich man's parlor to the latter's knowledge or love of archæology. Those who flatter themselves that they do know something of medieval history are not likely to do more than idly turn over the pages, reading here and there some of the many amusing and curious incidents. For real history one would go to a work that has some order or coherence, not to such a higgledy-piggledy jumble of oddities as this is.

As for the unlearned reader, this work will do him positive harm. For, surely, such a reader can only gather from its pages that medieval peoples must have been the most grotesque race that ever laid claim to being civilized. The author says he collected incidents "specially characteristic" of the period and then adds most innocently that "in the middle ages, as now, the *evil* generally lent itself best to picturesque description." Herein lies the hopelessly incurable defect of the book. It does not, and can never, leave in the average reader's mind any impression of these past peoples except what will be grotesque. Were there a running commentary, or were the incidents grouped according to subjects

or selected with due regard to the good and noble and sane as well as to the evil and silly—it might be a fairly correct picture of medieval peoples according to first-hand documents. But, as it is, it is a misleading caricature. You could as well teach botany by dumping a load of hay on a man, as teach medieval history by this undigested archaic lore.

Suppose, by way of comparative illustration, a future thirtieth century historian wished to give his readers a chance "to get at the real" America of 1911. If he followed the present author's method, I can well imagine him huddling together a lot of facts somewhat like the following: "I. A United States Senator in deshabille. II. A motorman with a glass eye. III. The Jew and the Reservoir. IV. The Policeman's cat," and so on. Undoubtedly true; perhaps, may be very amusing too. But what conceivable idea of America in 1911 would his students gather from such a mess? They would hardly understand the political structure of our land by the sight of said senator in unconventional garb, or its commercial activity from the motor's glass eye, or its general morale from a view of the policeman's cat. Well! Put this Medieval Garner in a green-horn's hand and his understanding of Medieval peoples will be equally untrue.

It is a pity that such a really learned and painstaking student should have thus spoiled his "thirty years'" labor. Mr. Coulton is not a historian in any sense, rather an indifferent antiquarian. He is just a collector of grotesque anecdotes.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

Handbook of Practical Economics, by J. Schrijvers, C. SS. R., translated from the French by F. M. Capes. St. Louis, B. Herder, 1910.

It is not by any means an easy task to compress the history and theory of political economy into three hundred pages and Father Schrijvers in making the attempt has met with a fair degree of success. The book has been translated into Dutch, Spanish, German and Italian as well as English and is having a wide sale. It is written from the point of view of Christian ethics, and frequent citations of Catholic authorities are made. The practical

illustrations are taken from European and especially from Belgian experience. This will be of advantage to American readers who wish to gain a fuller insight into European institutions, but on the other hand, it militates against the use of the book in this country as an introductory text.

The brevity of the treatment makes Father Schrijvers seem to divide all non-Catholic economists into the two camps of socialism and *laissez faire* and to locate Catholic writers in the space between these two camps. This is hardly fair, but even if it were a correct representation, one must not overwork the argument that the middle ground between the extremists is the right position merely because it is the middle ground. The following statement concerning State socialism "There is one socialistic idea according to which the state interferes, without any legitimate motive, in matters of private interest" might well evoke from the State socialist the objection that this use of the word *legitimate* is a begging of the question.

FRANK O'HARA.

The Attributes of God mirrored in the perfections of Mary. London: Burns and Oates; New York: Benzinger Bros. Pp. 203. Price, $.90.

This book of devotion is published anonymously, but notes appended to it by the censor are evidence of its careful revision. The subject is a fascinating one: God's image reflected in the soul of Mary! It would, of course, be saying too much to assert that the present little book has done full justice to the subject. The treatment is reverent and pious and well suited for easy spiritual reading; it is somewhat lacking, however, in systematic, orderly arrangement, but it is hard to be systematic when treating of so high a subject. It is particularly encouraging in these days to come across books like the present one which deal with God's nature in a simple, confiding way, ignoring all controversy and using revealed truth without fear or apology. We commend this little book as a devout, fervent treatise on one of the most important of all topics. The binding, paper and print are attractive.

E. P. BURKE, C. S. C.

Meditations for each Day of the Month of June, dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Translated and adapted from the Italian by Charles Santley. Benziger Brothers. Pp. 104.

This small volume may well find place among the many publications which have for their object the furtherance of devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It offers thirty meditations upon the virtues of the Sacred Heart—His charity, patience, humility, detachment, etc., and upon the Holy Eucharist. Most of these are in the form of reflections with spiritual aspirations at the close; yet a few (VII, IX, XVIII, XX, XXVI) are made up entirely of prayers and affections. Two or more texts from the "Imitation" or the Scriptures, at the head of each meditation, suggest the chief points for consideration, and apt quotations from the Scriptures freely interspersed throughout the body of the meditations give them a special relish. The book is printed in large, clear type and is neatly bound.

E. P. BURKE, C. S. C.

Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique, sous la direction de A. D'Ales. Fascicule IV, Dieu-Église. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1910.

The fourth fascicle of the new French Apologetic Dictionary is a worthy continuation of the work so happily accomplished in the preceding numbers. The most imposing contribution is the article on God by Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P. It comprises no less than seventy-two pages, and is a strong, erudite, well ordered presentation of the scholastic arguments for the existence of God, in which the notable objections put forth by Kant and later thinkers, including the Modernists of France, are met and refuted. The article on Sunday is made up of two contributions, one by Abbé Villien on the precept of the Church to keep holy the Sunday, the other by Mr. Gibon on the civil legislation concerning Sunday observance. It is natural that the writer should dwell chiefly on French legislation, but what he says of other countries, especially of England and the United States, is not as comprehensive as one would have the right to expect. Two articles contributed by authors, now deceased, to the earlier editions are left untouched,

that on Dispensations by Abbé Didiot and the very interesting account by Father Guilleux of the widely misunderstood *Jus primae noctis*. It is a pity that in articles thus retained the bibliography should not be brought up to date. Father de la Servière, S. J., contributes two lucid articles, one on the famous divorces of historical personages, the other on the Divine Right of Kings. The nine page article of Father Rivet, S. J. on the Duel is of considerable interest, but its apologetic value might have been enhanced, if the section on the private duel had been shortened so as to allow a larger treatment of the judicial duel of early times. The article on Dogma, to which Father Pinard, S. J., devotes thirty-one pages, is a masterly study, in which the true Catholic notion of dogma is distinguished from the erroneous conceptions of the present day, and ably vindicated. The long article on the Church, by Abbé de la Briere, but partly printed, takes up the closing pages of this useful and interesting fascicle.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

La Résurrection de Jésus-Christ; Les miracles evangéliques. Conférences apologétiques par MM. Jaquier et Bourchany. Paris, Gabalda et cie, 1911. 12mo, 312 pp.

This book is a collection of two series of lectures delivered before the Catholic faculties of Lyons in the early part of last year. The first series consists of four lectures by the Abbé Jacquier, well known for his excellent *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament,* and offers a solid demonstration of the reality of the bodily resurrection of our blessed Lord. In the first lecture, he treats of the sources of the story of the resurrection, the four Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles of St. Paul, and in a summary manner shows that their historic authority is above all reasonable doubt, that they truly represent the testimony of competent and trustworthy eye-witnesses. The second lecture, sets forth the evidence for the death, burial and resurrection of Jesus. In the third lecture, the personal experience of the disciples and their preaching of the resurrection of Christ from the very beginning are shown to be a sufficient warrant of the reality of this wonderful event. In the last lecture, the futile attempts of rationalists and unbelievers, from Strauss to Loisy, to explain away the recorded

apparitions of the risen Lord as merely subjective visions are laid bare in all their weakness. In presenting the evidence for the apparitions of Christ, the author recognizes the divergencies of testimony in detail, but shows that these divergencies do not lead to mutual contradiction, and being an indication of independent testimony, do but help to give greater confirmation to the objective character of visions that the apostles had of the risen Lord.

Praise is also due to the Abbé Bourchany for his series of four lectures on the Gospel Miracles. In his opening lecture, he establishes the credibility and historic character of the Gospel miracles chiefly on three grounds, first, the undeniable testimony of the apostles who were eye-witnesses; secondly, the absence of inventive coloring and the intimate association of many of the miracles with the recognized teachings of Christ; thirdly, the impossibility of explaining the influence of Christ on his disciples and on the multitudes, if the reality of his miracles be denied. In the second lecture, he demonstrates the supernatural character of the wonderful works of Christ, refuting at some length the theory so common to-day that Christ's cures, remarkable as they were, must be set down as the natural effects of powerful suggestion. The third lecture is devoted to the proof that these miracles of our blessed Lord are at the same time the expression and the proof of His divine Sonship. In the last lecture, he depicts the supreme holiness and perfection of Jesus, and presents it as a miracle of the moral order, likewise revealing His divine nature.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Commentaire français littéral de la Somme Theologique de S. Thomas d'Aquin, par le R. P. Thomas Pegues, O. P., T. V. *Traitè du gouvernement divin.* (Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 14 Rue des Arts, 1910.) This volume completes Fr. Pegues' commentaries on the first part of St. Thomas' *Summa.*[1]

Those who are familiar with the order of the *Summa*[2] know that in the part treated in this volume—Qu. 90 to Qu. 119, inc.—there are very many interesting and very important ques-

[1] See *Catholic University Bulletin*, Jan., 1908, Jan., 1909, Apr., 1910.
[2] *Ibid.*, April, 1909.

tions. The origin of the human soul; the origin of the body of the first man (90-91); the production of woman (92); the transmission of the human soul (118); the condition of our first parents and of their children in the state of innocence (94-102)—these titles indicate some of the problems which St. Thomas undertook to solve; and they are more actual today than they were six and a half centuries ago. God's government of the world (103) and the immediate effects of his governing power are also considered (104-105). Then follows a study of the effects produced, not immediately by Almighty God, but through creatures, purely spiritual, *i. e.* the Angels (106-114), purely corporeal (115-116), or composed of body and spirit, *i. e.*, men (117-119). Evolution and its relations to the soul and body of the first man: God's intimate presence in creatures, conserving them, operating in and with them: the definition and classification of miracles, and the rules for distinguishing them from the deceitful works of the demons: the influence exercised by good and bad angels in the affairs of the world: the true meaning of "destiny," or "fate": the influence of a man on other men (*e. g.*, by teaching, Qu. 117, a. 1)—assuredly these are questions that all are anxious to investigate. Those who can and are willing to study them in the text of the *Summa* will be fully repaid for their labors. Those who prefer to have the assistance of a competent translator and commentator are advised to choose Father Pegues, who possesses the happy faculty of making everything very clear and interesting, and of showing all the bearings of principles established. This is the fifth volume of his valuable publication, but we must bear in mind that the work contains a literal translation of the *Summa* as well as his luminous comments on the text, and the number of volumes cannot be excessive if all are to be as precious as those that have been published.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

Le schisme de Photius. Par J. Ruinaut. 16mo., pp. 64.

La pontifical. Par Jules Baudot. 16mo., pp. 65.

Vie de sainte Radegonde, Reine de France. Par Saint Fortunat. Traduction publiée avec une Introduction, des appendices et des notes. Par René Aigrain, du Clergé de Poitiers. Pp. 64.

La vie du Saint Benoit 'Aniane. Par Saint Ardon son Disciple. Traduite sur le Text même du Cartulaire d'Aniene. Par Fernand Baumes. Pp. 64.

La correspondence d'Ausone et de Paulin de Nole. Avec une Étude critique, des Notes, et un appendice sur le question du Christianisme d'Ausone. Par Pierre de Labriolle. Pp. 64.

L'État moderne et la neutralité scolaire. Par George Fonsegrive. Pp. 64.

L'Evangile et la sociologie. Par Docteur Grasset. Pp. 62.

All these pamphlets are published by the firm Bloud & Co. of Paris in their series "Science et Religion," which is intended to present in a cheap and attractive form reliable information on subjects of general interest to Catholics. About six hundred of these brochures have already been issued.

According to M. Ruinaut the religious question occupied a very insignificant part in the Photian schism. The real causes of the separation being differences in manners, culture and civilization and political antipathies augmented by the jealousy of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, because of recognition of Papal Supremacy.

In his excellent summary of the history of the Pontificale Dom Baudot presents in brief compass all the main facts concerning the origin and formation of the Pontificale in use at the present time. Because of the manner in which the sources are catalogued the work will be of value to others beside casual readers.

In addition to translating at large the account of the life of St. Radegundis by her intimate friend and correspondent Venantius Fortunatus, the Abbé Aigrain has added extracts from the writings of Baudonivia, one of her nuns and from Gregory of Tours who buried her. There is a good introductory chapter on the documents themselves.

The interesting figure of St. Benedict of Aniane and his immense influence in the church during the reigns of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious, have been sadly neglected by historians. The Life of the Saint written by a saint and translated by M. Baumes will serve to make the great monastic reformer better known and will throw much light on the condition of the Carlovingian church.

The literature of the fourth century offers no more striking insight into the peculiar relations which existed at that time be-

tween Christians and pagans than the correspondence between Ausonius and Paulinus of Nola, which was occasioned by the conversion of the latter. M. Labriolle has written a helpful introduction containing a brief presentation of the facts leading up to the interchange of letters.

The question proposed by M. Fonsegrive,—Is the modern state qualified to give a moral education?—is of more than passing interest in view of the widespread secularisation of instruction at the present time. After discussing briefly the functions of the state and its limitations, the author comes to the conclusion that in matters of moral education neither the state nor any other organization is competent to deal with the subject unless it is equipped with a complete doctrine regarding man and unless it has a definite philosophy of life. Because of the "neutrality" or "laicisation" of schools in France, some conclusions of a practical character are arrived at to meet that situation.

While defending the "Science of Sociology," Doctor Grasset sees no hope for its effectiveness unless it is based on the Gospel, for Sociology based on science alone knows neither duty nor obligation.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Kirchengeschichtliche Apologie. Sammlung kirchengeschichtlichen Kritiken. Texte und Quellen auf apologetischer Grundlage. Herausgegeben von Dr. Theodor Deimel. Herder, Freiburg, 1910. Pp. xix + 395.

The purpose which the author of this book had in mind was to provide an armory of texts and quotations from various sources, covering the most important phases of church history, in order to furnish, especially to teachers and pupils in secondary schools, the means of replying to the usual objections against the Catholic Church. The documents are arranged chronologically and embrace extracts from sources and authorities extending from Josephus down to the Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis. The works which are laid under contribution are not all from Catholic pens. An extremely large number of the quotations come from the works on general history such as those of Ranke, Weiss, Weber and Leo, or well-known authors like Gregorovius and Janssen.

While the quotations are well chosen the value of the work for students generally would have been immensely enhanced, had the author used works of a more special character, as *v. g.* Wietersheim-Dahn in connection with the Völkerwandrung, and had he, in addition to the quotations, appended a list of select readings and references. The method and the purpose of the book are excellent and it cannot fail to serve a useful purpose in the circles for which it was intended.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Jahrbuch der Zeit- und Kulturgeschichte, 1910. Dritter Jahrgang. Unter Mitwirkung von Fachmännern, herausgegeben von Dr. Franz Schnürer. Herder, Freiburg, 1910. Large 8o. Pp. 439.

The third in this series of Herder's Jahrbücher more than fulfills the high promise of its predecessors. It presents a thoroughly well-ordered survey of the achievements in various fields of human activity during one year. The vast subject is dealt with in six sections. I. Ecclesiastical affairs. With sub-titles; a) General, b) Germany, c) Austria; d) Foreign. II. Political affairs. a) Germany, b) Austria-Hungary, c) Foreign. III. Social and Economic Questions. a) Economic conditions, b) Social Movement, c) Law, d) Education. IV. Theology with subsections on Philosophy. History and Linguistics. V. Literature. a) Poetry, b) The Drama, c) Prose writings. IV. Art. a) Plastic Arts. b) Music, c) The Theatre. There are in addition two other sections, a chronicle of all the principal events of the year and a Necrology. The various chapters are all written by specialists and while, as might naturally be expected, more space and attention are given to Germany and its affairs, than to other countries, the work omits very little in the sections covered which is likely to be of permanent interest, and hence in it future historians will find stores of well-arranged and valuable material. The real worth of these volumes will be recognized a quarter of a century from now.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Twentieth Century Socialism. What it is not; What it is; How it may come. By Edmund Kelly, M. A. F. G. S.,Late Lecturer on Municipal Government at Columbia University in the City of New York. Pp. xv + 446. New York, Longmans, Green & Co.

If the Socialist movement could be irrevocably committed to march towards its goal along the way mapped out for it in this volume, and to stop at the goal here set up, much of its menace would be dissipated. But as one reads the temperate optimism expressed for the future, as well as the equally temperate arraignment of present conditions contained in this exposition, and then contrasts the author's statement of the socialistic case with that which prevails in the abounding literature written by other socialists for the working classes, one wonders first how far the rank and file would be willing to acknowledge him as a leader or spokesman.

The first section of the book is devoted to the task of removing misconceptions about what socialism really it. Among those who are accused of grossly misrepresenting it are no less important personages than the President and the ex-President of the United States. These gentlemen, however, on the author's own showing, have drawn their data from genuine socialistic sources; but they have made the mistake of describing as socialism, he affirms, the crude socialism of the last century, which is not to be identified with the socialism of to-day. The next section is devoted to expounding the evils of the present capitalistic system, due chiefly to the uncontrolled competition which prevails in it. Can competition be replaced by coöperation? Yes, the late Mr. Kelly argues. But, in the third section containing his constructive scheme, he makes room for a limited measure of competition, and instead of the State socialism which would place all the means of production in the hands of the State, he would allow the State sole control only over the great necessaries of life; and control over competition just so far as would be necessary to prevent the evils that follow from the unlimited competition of to-day. Compensation would be paid by the State to the owners of whatever property, industrial or real, which the State would find it necessary to expropriate. The farmer would be left in undisturbed possession of his land, though, in order to enable the State to wrestle with the problem of providing proper housing for the workers, and

proper sanitary and artistic arrangements for the cities and large towns, urban land would pass into State control. By abandoning State socialism for this system the author meets one objection commonly urged against socialism; that it would give the government a power destructive of individual liberty. This criticism he admits has ample foundation as against all schemes of State socialism in which the State in order to carry out the endless tasks of universal production and distribution would be obliged to create an immense army of officials, and unduly interfere in the affairs of every individual by assigning tasks and controlling the hours and form of labor. But this, he argues, would not occur in the present plan. Another objection which is handled, not without plausibility, is the common one that the corruption which exists at present in our government, national and local, demonstrates the unwisdom of placing at its disposal an immensely wider field than is open to it to-day for exploitation by personal greed.

Enough has been said to indicate that the writer of this work is to be classed with the school of Mr. Spargo and Mr. Kirkup and not with that of which Mr. Belford Bax is a prophet, nor with that of the coöperative commonwealth or the New Economy of Mr. Gronlund. The book will well repay perusal by all interested in the question. Its character emphasizes the truth that, owing to the modifications which socialistic ideas have undergone in many quarters, a great deal of the arguments hitherto relied upon by the opponents of the movement fail to reach the position upon which many of the more thoughtful socialists stand to-day.

James J. Fox.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The following is text of the Sermon delivered by Rev. Dr. Healy on the Feast of St. Paul:

"And coming He preached peace to you that were afar off, and peace to them that were nigh. For by Him we have access both in one spirit to the Father. Now, therefore, you are no more strangers and foreigners; but you are fellow-citizens with the saints, and the domestics of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone, in whom all the building, being framed together, groweth up into an holy temple in the Lord."—*Eph.* ii. 17–21.

A notable feature in the life and works of St. Paul is his intense patriotism and his pride of race. He gloried in the fact that he was a Jew, he referred with exultation to the city of his birth, and by word and deed showed himself conscious of the privileges implied in Roman citizenship. He was a Jew, and was proud of it. "They are Hebrews," he says, "so am I. They are Israelites so am I. They are the seed of Abraham: so am I." (2 *Cor.* xi, 22). Nor was it sufficient that he was a Jew: he prided himself because he belonged to the most favored tribe of Jews. He was of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews. (*Phil.* iii, 5.) Furthermore, he will not have it forgotten that he belonged to the sect among the Jews who had clung most tenaciously to the rites and traditions of their fathers. He was a Pharisee of the Pharisees. (*Acts,* xxiii, 6). And because none knew better than he the history and the mission of his people there was reason for his exultation. They were Israelites "to whom belonged the adoption as of children, and the glory, and the testament, and the giving of the law, and the service of God and the promises, whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things. (*Rom.* ix, v. 5.)

But, Jew as he was and proud of his lineage, he was also proud of the city in which he was born. "I am a Jew," he says, "of Tarsus in Cilicia, a citizen of no mean city." (*Acts* xxi, 39.) Here, too, he had reason to rejoice. The fame of his birthplace as

a centre of learning, and its commercial importance justified his harmless vanity. Pride of race, however, and civic allegiance were not so strong in Paul's soul as to make him unmindful of the fact that he belonged to a wider confederation, that he was a Roman citizen, that he possessed the privilege of fellowship in the great Empire which extended from Mesopotamia to the Pillars of Hercules. Nor, when occasion arose, was he slow to assert the rights that inhered in that dignity. "They have beaten us publicly, uncondemned," he says in Phillippi, "men that are Romans, and have cast us into prison and now they cast us out privately." (*Acts* XVI, 39.) Again in Jerusalem, when stretched on the rack, he whispered to the Centurion: "Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman and uncondemned? (*Acts* XXII, 25), and the magic of the words *civis Romanus* stayed the executioner's lash. Finally, through the potency of the formula, "I appeal to Cæsar" (*Acts* XXV, 11), the charge for which he had been detained in prison two years was placed beyond the jurisdiction of any petty court or magistrate and referred to the great tribunal of Cæsar himself, and Paul went in person to Rome.

Thus was St. Paul willing to take advantage of those rights and immunities. He knew it was an insult to the great commonwealth to degrade a Roman, to make him suffer unjustly, a crime; and to that extent did he value those merely adventitious aids in enhancing the dignity of the common nature of mankind. Is it not permissible to see in the conduct of St. Paul, this boasting of his race and his city, and taking advantage of his political affiliations, the feeling that the dignities he enjoyed were merely adumbrations of the greater honors of which he was the apostle, and the nobler citizenship to be obtained through union with the true believers in that larger confederation of which he speaks to the Ephesians, "where there would be no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints and the domestics of God." (*Eph.* II, 19.)

The attitude which St. Paul thus took is not without significance as illustrating to some extent his views regarding the effect which belief in the new faith should have in determining the stand the convert should take towards old lines of distinction and former political or social connections. These statements and incidents in the career of the apostle occur at different times in his life; they were made in various circumstances, and may thus

be regarded as forming part of the settled policy which he had adopted towards the social environment into which his apostolic labors carried him and as being indissolubly associated with the general character of his Christian mission. He, above and beyond his colleagues, deserved the title, apostle of the Gentiles, and on him more than on any of the others rested the burden of defining for the neophyte Christians how they should comport themselves towards the established political and social order.

It is true that St. Paul's mission, like that of his Divine Master, was not primarily for the social regeneration of men, but for their spiritual redemption. Social conditions change, but the problem of attaining salvation is eternally the same, and the road thither never varies. This is what gives the gospel its perennial vitality. Each age has its own special needs and to each the gospel supplies an answer so clear and cogent as to make it appear that the teaching of Jesus was delivered for just such contingencies. It was so when paganism was driven out of its entrenchments in Greek Philosophy in the great Trinitarian and Christological struggle; it was so when the order and culture of the old civilization seemed threatened with extinction in the wave of heathen barbarism and anarchy which opened the middle ages. Religious and social chaos were averted by the mighty force of truth and unity in the religion of Christ.

The present, like the past, has its own peculiar problem. The rejection of authority and the assertion of individual judgment in matters of religion in the 16th century led to the rejection of authority in matters political and the demand for political equality. Since then the field of contention has been widened. Political equality has not resulted in the equal distribution of material advantages and privations, and the way to the attainment of equality, economic as well as political, it is asserted, is through the destruction of the existing social order. The anarchist and the individualist see the desired result in the removal of the restraints imposed by the prevailing social conditions, the collectivist and communist still further extending social control. To many in both camps religion makes no appeal. The lack of personal responsibility in the anarchist finds its counterpart in the economic necessity of the philosophic socialist.

The exigencies of this propaganda have at times turned the minds of men in both parties to seek in the Life and Words of

Christ arguments to support their respective systems. His teachings and His life have been so construed that He stands forth in their pages, if not the founder, at least the advocate and exemplar, of their theories. In the words of a blasphemous Frenchman, "He was *le bon sans culotte*," to others He was a demagogue and an anarchist. It is said of Him that He had no idea of civil government; that it appeared to Him an abuse, pure and simple. His conception of the world was socialist, with a Galilean coloring. "His dream was a vast social revolution in which rank should be levelled and all authority brought low." Another writer says: "There is not one of our great moral institutions which the New Testament does not ignore or condemn. The rights of property are denied or suspected: the ties of family are broken: there is no longer any nation or patriotism. The morality of the primitive Christians is homeless, sexless and nationless." In the same manner numerous phrases have ben coined to express the social import of the gospel. We find one man saying: Poverty was an indispensable condition for gaining admission to the kingdom of Heaven, and another who declares that: "an industrial democracy would be the social actualization of Christianity. It is the logic of the Sermon on the Mount."

In view of the wide circulation of such views and hundreds of others like them, it may not be amiss to consider what position St. Paul took regarding some of the questions which are thus stated so persistently. Though it is true that St. Paul does not give any systematic exposition of Christianity as a social scheme, it would be an injustice to him to say that he did not realize that certain conditions of life were wholly out of keeping with the Christian ideal of perfection. He was the first to proclaim the message of salvation of Christian liberty and fraternal love in communities where family ties were practically annulled, where the great mass of the people felt directly or indirectly the evils of the slave-system, and in which there was no bond of unity except that imposed from without. Hence, though St. Paul had no desire to interfere in the secular affairs of his time, or to antagonise any class, or to advocate the claims of any special form of society, it was incumbent on him as the apostle of the Gentiles to leave nothing undone toward promoting the success of his special mission and to instruct his converts as to their duties towards the social organism on which he was laying the founda-

tions of the future great fabric of Christianity. On him rested the obligation of determining for all time who were to be admitted to the Christian fold and who, because of their condition, their calling, or their crimes, were to be excluded.

Though he was as one born out of due time, and though he was the least of the apostles, he labored more abundantly than all the rest (1 *Cor.* xv, 10), he was instructed by Christ Himself and thus he may reasonably be considered to have been in a position to judge of the propriety or impropriety of regarding certain states and conditions of life as being incompatible with the requirements of the gospel. Hence, while we may not expect to find in St. Paul's writings a detailed enunciation of the principles of social science, we may reasonably hope to find evidence which will be convincing as to whether Our Lord's teaching was disruptive of social order or whether it was productive of such union among men as can be described as communistic, or socialist.

Turning then to what may be called the social science in the writings of St. Paul, if such a phrase is permissible, and taking his ideas regarding the constitution of society, ideas which are presupposed rather than expressed, we find that the fundamental predicate, the ultimate unit of society to his mind was the individual composed of a body and soul. By reason of this duality there are two spheres of human activity, the physical and spiritual, and through the proper exercise of the faculties of his higher nature man is capable of working out for himself a destiny that transcends material conditions. This doctrine of freedom and responsibility underlies the entire scheme of life taught by St. Paul and at times finds explicit expression. Writing to the Romans (vii, 23) he says: "But I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members." Further on in the same epistle (viii, 3) not only the principle but its results are enunciated. "For, if you live according to the flesh, you shall die, but, if, by the spirit, you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." Man is, then, master of his own destiny. He has the faculty of willing and choosing and by reason of this endowment he is placed above the predestination of the sociologist as well as the predestination of the theologian.

Paul next viewed society as a great confederation of humanity joined together by a common faith in Christ. This thought is

fundamental in all his teaching regarding human relations. In his epistle to the Corinthians (XII, 12) he says: For in one spirit were we all baptised into one body, whether Jew or Gentile, whether bond or free. There are many members but one body. The same thought finds expression in his epistle to the Romans (XII, 5. 6). "For as in one body we have many members, but all members have not the same office, so we being many are one body in Christ, and everyone members of another." The close fellowship implied in this great union did not exclude ties of nationality nor of race. Paul himself was not less a Christian because he was born a Jew nor because he was a Roman citizen. The bond, the coherent principle, in this confederacy, was stronger than that of race or class or state, it came from the natural human instinct of association sanctified by faith and Christian love. "Be ye therefore," says Paul, "followers of Christ and walk in love as Christ also hath loved us." (*Eph.* V, 1, 2.)

That nothing of a communistic or socialistic character was associated in the mind of St. Paul with the great brotherhood of mankind rendering and accepting mutual service, is clear from his many references to differences of gifts and differences of ministry. In fact the very equality which he preached, the equality of a spiritual destiny, had its root in inequality. "For I mean not that others should be eased and you burdened, but by an equality. In this present time let your abundance supply their want, that their abundance may supply your want, that there may be an equality."

Coming down to more practical things and dealing with the administrative affairs of society, we find St. Paul teaching that not only is civil authority necessary but that it derives its power from God. Resistance to it means contravention of divine law, and obedience an obligation imposed by conscience. "For there is no power," he says, "but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation. . . . Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath but also for conscience sake. For therefore also you pay tribute. For they are ministers of God serving unto this purpose. Render therefore to all men their dues. Tribute to whom tribute is due: custom to whom custom: fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor." (*Rom.* XIII, 1 seq.)

The same feeling of the necessity of authority and subordination which governed his conception of civil government ruled the mind

of St. Paul in regard to other states of life. He inculcate the necessity of obedience in the family (*Col.* III, 18-25) and above all, recognizing the existence of different classes in society, he urged mutual forbearance and kindness as the means of promoting harmony and success. "Servants," he says, "be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart as to Christ. Not serving to the eye as it were pleasing men, but as servants of Christ doing the will of God from the heart. . . . And you masters do the same things to them, forbearing threatenings, knowing that the Lord both of them and you is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with him." (*Col.* III, 20 seq.)

As the inequality of station implied in the position of master and servant arises from unequal distribution of property and wealth, we find that St. Paul, accepting the fact, accepted also the cause. In the first place, not only does he not raise any objection to the holding of private property as being inconsistent with Christianity, but he states that its acquisition is part of the duty of those on whom others are dependent. "For neither," he says, "ought the children to lay up for the parents but the parents for the children." (2 *Cor.* XII, 14.) In addition to being legitimate he regards the possession of wealth as desirable inasmuch as it affords the means and opportunity to practice certain virtues. "Therefore," he says to the Galatians (VI, 10) speaking of charity and good works, "while we have time, let us work good to all men but especially to those who are of the household of the faith." In fact he exhorts men (*Eph.* IV, 28) to lay up more than is necessary for their own needs in order to be of service to others.

The fact that there were not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble (1 *Cor.* I, 26) proves that the Christian Church was mostly recruited from among the poor and the lowly, but the presence of even a few who were wise or mighty or noble shows that the new faith had not levelled all distinctions. There were rich men in the Church even in the time of St. Paul, yet they are never ordered to renounce their possessions on pain of exclusion from the community. St. Paul does not suggest to Philemon that he should cease to be a slave owner. He sends back to him the runaway Onesimus but he exhorts the master to receive not as a servant but instead of a servant a most dear brother (*Philem.* I, 16.) He writes to Timothy (1 *Tim.* VI. 18)

to charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God." He exhorts them "to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily to communicate to others. (1 *Tim.* VI, 18.)

Though none was more insistent than St. Paul in his declarations regarding the necessity of almsgiving and the claims which the poor have on their more fortunate brethren he was far from identifying poverty with holiness. For his own part he says he will be a charge to no one. "For you remember, brethren," he says to the Thessalonians, (II, 9) "our labor and toil, working night and day lest we should be chargeable to any of you."

The sturdy spirit of independence which led him to work at his rough trade rather than accept the bounty of others does not deprive St. Paul of the credit of having laid in the large missionary field where he labored the foundations of the systematic almsgiving and charity which were so characteristic of the early Church. He admits the existence of an indigent class who are dependent on the charity of others, and he himself made many collections for needy churches among those who were more fortunate (*Gal.* II, 10, 1 *Cor.* XVI, 1., 2 *Cor.* VIII, 4, IX, 1, *Rom.* XV, 25, *Acts* XI, 19, XXIV, 17). He constantly asserts, however, in every case that the offerings are voluntary and to be made from interior promptings of charity rather than from any external title inherent in the needy or the community. (1 *Cor.* XVI, 2.) Though everyone who was able was bound to give, the reward was proportioned not to the measure but to the motive of the gift. And finally, as showing that charity, not justice, was the basis of almsgiving, we have his famous phrases, or Hymn of Charity as it has been called. (1 *Cor.* XIII, 1-3.) "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And if I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

Turning to another sphere of human relations, we find the same clearness and force in the manner in which St. Paul asserts the unity and sanctity of marriage as the basis of sound social ideals. Except when faith is endangered he will not permit divorce even from an unbeliever (1 *Cor.* VII, 12). He taught the

virtues of kindness, justice and freedom which, spreading outward and upward, led to the extinction of the institution of slavery.

Thus, though St. Paul did not profess to be a teacher of social or economic science, we find enough in his writings to enable us to draw in rough outline at least the scheme of social organisation existent or potential which to his mind would not conflict with the acceptance of the Gospel. To him, men without abandoning the ties of family, of race, or of nationality, but with racial pride and animosity removed from their hearts, were to be united in fraternal fellowship in one large Christian federation. Society was to be transformed into something truly catholic, rising above, but not obliterating, other distinctions. Men were to be mindful of their duty to the Creator and thus would the true nature and aims of government be understood and exemplified and thus would the mutual duties and obligations of ruler and subject be defined and observed. With one heart and one soul each should have his place in this spiritual commonwealth, and each, performing the duties of his state and calling, would serve all through a service of love to his maker.

There is true individualism here, because nowhere are the rights and obligations of the individual so fully asserted. But this individualism is not anarchy: because in freeing men from attachment to earthly things the way was opened to closer union with God and to communion with their fellows. Nor was the communion which St. Paul preached communism, unless it be the communism "which raises the social connection of human beings from the sphere of convention to that of moral obligation, the socialism which rests not upon a conflict of interests, but upon the consciousness of spiritual unity and a common goal." With a mind at once prophetic and apostolic, the great apostle of the Gentiles saw new forms of society and a new concept of humanity arising from the seeds sown by Christ and the preachers of the Gospels; he saw the causes of dissension and hatred vanish and he conjured up the vision of the time when, in the light of faith, and through the influence of charity, there would be neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond or free, neither male nor female, but all one in Christ. (*Gal.* III, 28.)

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

A. O. H. Scholarships. Mr. John Joseph Phillips of New York City has been appointed to the Hibernian Scholarship recently founded by the Ancient Order of Hibernians in New York County. The Hibernian Scholarships continue to increase in number. The other A. O. H. students at the University are Charles Patrick McDonnell of Florence, Massachusetts; Christian James McWilliams of Brooklyn, New York; and James Enright Woods of New London, Connecticut. In the near future, A. O. H. scholars are expected from Illinois, Indiana, and Montana. Quite recently the Hibernians of the District of Columbia founded a Scholarship at the University. One of the conditions of these scholarships is regular instruction in the language, literature, history, and antiquities of Ireland. Eventually the A. O. H. scholars at the University will form the nucleus of the student body pursuing the courses of the Gaelic Chair founded in 1894 by the Ancient Order of Hibernians at the Omaha convention. The present occupant of the Chair is Dr. John Joseph Dunn, one of the most eminent of the younger generation of Celtologists.

Lecture on Temperance. Among the conditions of the Chair of Psychology, founded at the opening of the University by the Catholic Total Abstinence Society of America, is the delivery of lectures on subjects connected with the life and work of Father Matthew, the great Irish Apostle of Temperance. This year the first of these lectures was given at the University on January 5th by the Very Reverend Alexander P. Doyle, C. S. P., on "The Catholic Church and The Prohibition Movement." The second lecture was given on January 26th by Rev. Peter O'Callaghan, C. S. P., of St. Mary's Church, Chicago, on "The Power of Example in Temperance Reform."

Illustrated Lecture. One of the most interesting public lectures of the year was delivered January 12th on "The Ruined Cities of Asia Minor," by Dr. David M. Robinson of Johns Hopkins University. The lecture was illustrated with views taken by the lecturer himself on the occasion of an archæological expedition into the heart of Asia Minor.

Donations. The University has recently received the sum of Five Thousand Dollars from the estate of Mrs. Ann Yarnall of Philadelphia. The will of Mrs. Yarnall was made in 1886 and this bequest was probably one of the first made by individual Catholics for the support and development of the University.

Registration. The registered students at the University number this year about three hundred and sixty. Of these, one hundred and sixty are lay students and come mostly from our leading Catholic Colleges and High Schools. The ecclesiastical students number two hundred, of whom one hundred and forty-two are novices of the several religious orders whose colleges adjoin the University. The other fifty-eight are secular ecclesiastics, forty-three of whom are residents in Divinity Hall and fifteen in the Apostolic Mission House. Of the religious ecclesiastics, the Dominicans number thirty-seven, the Holy Cross Fathers thirty-one, the Paulists twenty-seven, the Marists twenty-two, the Franciscans nineteen, and the Sulpicians four. Thirty states are represented in the University, also the following foreign countries:—British West Indies, Canada, Germany, Ireland, England, Cuba, France, Russia, Hungary, and the Philippines.

Lecture on Engineering. On Friday, February 3rd, Mr. Benjamin T. Allen, Chief Engineer, Harrisburg Foundry and Machine Works, gave an illustrated lecture in Assembly Room, McMahon Hall, on "The Development of the High Speed Corliss Engine." This lecture was largely attended, both by the students of the Mechanical Engineering Department of the

University and by mechanical engineers from the city of Washington, and proved highly interesting and instructive to all.

Contest in Elocution. On the evening of January 25, 1911, the Junior Class held its Contest in Elocution in the Assembly Room of McMahon Hall. Of the seven contestants, Messrs. Bernard A. Kummer and Frederick C. Dietz were awarded the first and second prize, respectively. The Judges were Doctors Turner, McCarthy and Lennox.

NECROLOGY.

Most Reverend Patrick John Ryan, D. D.

The death of Archbishop Ryan of Philadelphia has deprived the University of one of its most zealous and enlightened Directors, a true friend, wise in council and untiring in active coöperation in everything that promoted the cause of higher education. Patrick John Ryan was born at Thurles, Tipperary, February 26, 1831. He made his early studies at home and in a private school in Dublin. Entering Carlow College at the age of sixteen, he continued his study of the classics and completed his philosophical and theological course in 1852. After having been ordained sub-deacon he came to this country and was appointed Professor of English Literature in the Theological Seminary at St. Louis. In 1853 he was ordained priest and appointed to the Church of the Annunciation, St. Louis. In 1860 he was transferred to the Cathedral. During the Civil War he was Chaplain of the military prison and hospital. In 1872 he was appointed Auxiliary Bishop of St. Louis, where he remained until 1883, when he was appointed Archbishop of Philadelphia. During the seventeen years of his administration, that important province made wonderful progress both in material and in spiritual prosperity. The Archbishop was known throughout the English speaking world as an orator of exceptional ability and effectiveness. Religion, Education, Charity and the public welfare were his favorite subjects, and the cause of humanity as well as the interests of the Church always found in him a ready and able champion. His death at his residence in Philadelphia, February 11, 1911, threw the whole Church in America into mourning, and called forth expressions of esteem and veneration from many distinguished men outside the fold. May he rest in Peace.